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J.L. Schellenberg has recently formulated a new logical problem of evil that is claimed to avoid 
Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence. I begin my argument against this new formulation by 
analyzing the grounding for some of God’s maximal perfections. God’s maximal moral 
perfection, for example, is grounded in virtuous potentialities that are disposed to the 
actualization of virtuous actions. From this account, I argue that Schellenberg’s logical problem 
of evil fails due to one of the following two reasons. First, some good actualizations of good 
potentialities require evil but compose the best worlds. Second, both (1) good actualizations that 
require evil; and (2) love that is directed at the flourishing of individuals, which requires that 
their potentials become actualizations, some of which require evil; are morally sufficient reasons 
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I. Introduction: The Logical Problem of Evil 
A. Plantinga’s Free Will Defence 
Since Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence,1 many philosophers of religion have taken the logical 
problem of evil (LPE) to be solved.2 Plantinga argues that there is at least one broadly logically 
possible world in which God and evil coexist. He claims that in order for creatures to have 
morally significant freedom, it must be possible for them to do what is right and it must be 
possible for them to do what is wrong. This is a libertarian conception of free will, so if God 
were to prevent creatures from erring, they would no longer have morally significant freedom. If 
it were no longer possible to err, creatures would no longer be free. Thus, if there are free 
creatures in a world, they might go astray. Because, according to Plantinga, a world in which 
there are creatures who have morally significant freedom is better than a world in which 
creatures do not have that, God’s creation of a universe in which there are free creatures who 
might go astray is a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. Morally significant freedom 
is valuable. God makes creatures with it. They might go astray to some degree.3 
 An objection arises. J.L. Mackie points out that it is broadly logically possible for 
creatures to have morally significant freedom and never to go astray. If a creature genuinely has 
morally significant freedom, then it could choose what is good on any given occasion. However, 
if it could choose to do good on any given occasion, and if it has morally significant freedom, it 
could also choose to do what is good on another given occasion. Why, then, could it not always 
                                                
1 Alvin Plantinga, “God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom,” The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974), pp. 164-195. 
2 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, first 
edition, edited by Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 34. 
3 Alvin Plantinga, pp. 165-167. Because Plantinga is discussing the LPE, he does not need to consider the variety, 
extent, or horrendousness of the evils of the actual world. He only needs to find one possible world with some evil in 
it, however small that evil might be. So, going astray might entail one creature committing a small amount of evil. 
 2 
choose to do what is good? There is no impossibility for morally free creatures always to do 
what is right. Why, then, did God not make that world?4 
 Plantinga responds by claiming that God, while maintaining that creatures have morally 
significant freedom, cannot actualize just any possible world. What happens in any given world 
is largely dependent upon what those free creatures would do in certain states of affairs in that 
possible world. They have morally significant freedom after all. Thus, God cannot just actualize 
any possible world in which morally significant creatures always do what is right. He5 has to 
work with the counterfactuals of freedom – that is, the counterfactuals of how a given free 
creature would act in certain circumstances – that are present within a possible world.6 
 Moreover, because Plantinga is answering the LPE, all he has to find is one broadly 
logically possible scenario in which God and evil coexist. So, he continues. It is possible that 
every possible being that could be created suffers from transworld depravity. Transworld 
depravity is a condition in which “no matter what circumstances [God] places [a given being] in, 
so long as he leaves him significantly free, he will take at least one wrong action.”7 Because God 
cannot actualize just any world without impinging upon morally significant freedom, God has to 
work with what free creatures will do in given circumstances. Yet, it is possible that every 
creature that God could create, when given morally significant freedom, will go astray at least 
once. On this possibility, God cannot create creatures with morally significant freedom without 
also actualizing a world in which there is some sort of evil. Whether transworld depravity 
                                                
4 J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64, no. 254 (1955), p. 209. 
5 Some philosophers have argued that it is equally accurate to characterize God as feminine as it is to characterize 
God as masculine. For ease of writing and to avoid confusion, I use capitalized masculine pronouns throughout this 
thesis to designate God. See Michael Rea, “Gender as a Divine Attribute,” Religious Studies 52, no. 1 (2016), pp. 
97-115. 
6 Alvin Plantinga, pp. 169-184. 
7 Ibid., p. 186, emphasis in the original. 
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actually extends to all people or not is irrelevant to the fact that this is at least a possibility.8 
Thus, it seems that Plantinga has answered the LPE. 
 
B. Schellenberg’s New Logical Problem of Evil 
In recent years, the LPE has received new attention with some philosophers attempting to revive 
it. J.L. Schellenberg, for example, has presented a new formulation of the LPE, which he 
believes avoids Plantinga’s Free Will Defence.9 He claims that the transition from “God without 
evil prior to creation – ‘prior’ here may be taken logically or temporally or in both senses – to 
God with evil after” is not metaphysically possible.10 
Given three traditional theistic assumptions, Unsurpassable Greatness, Ontological 
Independence, and Prior Purity, it seems to follow that God and evil cannot coexist. Schellenberg 
defines these theistic assumptions as follows: 
Unsurpassable Greatness (UG): God is the greatest possible being. 
 
Ontological Independence (OI): No world created by God (or any part thereof) is 
a part of God. 
 
Prior Purity (PP): Prior to creation (whether “prior” be taken logically or 
temporally) there is no evil in God of any kind.11 
 
From UG and OI, Schellenberg claims: 
(G) Prior to creation all goods are already contained in God.12 
                                                
8 Ibid., pp. 184-190. 
9 J.L. Schellenberg, pp. 34-48. In this article, he presents two new LPEs, the modeling approach and the motives 
approach. To save space, I will focus on the former. However, the arguments in this paper can be used to address the 
latter argument. I leave such a task to the reader. 
10 Ibid., p. 34., emphases in the original. 
11 Ibid., pp. 35-36. I follow Jerome Gellman in his abbreviations of these claims, which do not appear in 
Schellenberg’s original piece. See his response to Schellenberg, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” Faith and 
Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2015), pp. 439-452. 
12 J.L. Schellenberg, p. 36, emphasis in the original. I use Gellman’s abbreviation here as well. 
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This does not mean that God has every good-token, but every good-type. For example, God does 
not token kindness to a child by nursing it as a mother does. Nevertheless, God does display 
kindness toward the helpless in a similar fashion, though not physically.13 So, he clarifies what 
he means: 
(G1) For every possible good, among the distinguishable good-types it tokens or 
instances is at least one instanced in God.14 
 
Were (G1) not to be true, God would not be the greatest possible being. There would be some 
possible being who tokens every good-type that God tokens, but who would also token good-
types God does not token. 
 Additionally, it should be noted that, because God is the greatest possible being, any 
instancing in God of a good-type is better than any instancing not found in God.15 From this and 
(G1), he concludes: 
(1) Every possible non-Divine good is greatly exceeded by a good of the same type 
existing in God prior to creation.16 
Because of OI, he concludes: 
(2) Every good in a world is greatly exceeded by a good of the same type existing in God 
prior to creation.17 
Given PP, we can conclude: 
(3) All goodness found in God prior to creation is pure goodness: goodness-without-evil.18 
From (2) and (3) follows (4), from which (5) can be concluded: 
                                                
13 Jerome Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2015), p. 440. 
14 J.L. Schellenberg, p. 37. I use Gellman’s abbreviation here as well. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 38. 
17 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
18 Ibid. 
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(4) Every good in a world is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same type existing in 
God prior to creation. 
(5) Every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure good of 
the same type existing in God prior to creation.19 
Schellenberg then introduces his conception of modeling goods: “any good that purely 
resembles or images or mirrors or reflects a pure good in God we might think of as modeling that 
good.”20 From this, he concludes: 
(6) If every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure good 
of the same type, existing prior to creation in God, then any world with goods 
permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure 
goods in God.21 
It should be noted that Schellenberg does not mean that these worlds with modeling goods have 
modeling goods but could also have evil-involving-goods – that is, goods that permit or require 
evil. What he means is that these worlds with modeling goods have no evil-involving-goods 
whatsoever. He says elsewhere that these worlds “are by definition greater than and so distinct 
from ‘any world permitting or requiring evil’”.22 These worlds with modeling goods are 
supposed to be pure worlds.  
Continued, from (5) and (6): 
                                                
19 Ibid., emphases in the original. 
20 Ibid., emphasis in the original. Because Schellenberg uses the language of “reflects” and other relational words, 
this seems to suggest that he is using value-laden words to indicate final value, not intrinsic value. X is intrinsically 
valuable iff x has intrinsic properties that make it valuable. X is finally valuable iff x is valuable for its own sake (or 
as an end), as opposed to valuable for the sake of something else (or as a means). X is extrinsically and finally 
valuable iff x is valuable for its own sake, but is valuable because of extrinsic properties. For example, a rare object 
is valuable because of extrinsic properties (namely, its rarity), but it might be valuable for its own sake. Modeling 
goods, then, are valuable not intrinsically, but extrinsically, as they relate to God’s goodness by, say, mirroring it; 
and they are finally valuable. See Francesco Orsi, Value Theory (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 25-44. Unless 
otherwise specified, I will use value-laden words to indicate final value. 
21 J.L. Schellenberg, p. 39. 
22 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy 35, no. 4 (2018), p. 467, 
emphasis in the original. 
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(7) Any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the 
corresponding pure goods in God (call the latter a “greater world”).23 
Schellenberg continues. As a finite world improves, it becomes more like God. It 
approaches what is of supreme value, on the assumption that UG holds. Given PP, the closer one 
gets to God, the less evil there is. Surely God is able to create some such greater world in which 
there is no evil and the goods within that world reflect pure goods of God. There are infinitely 
many possible worlds, and, presumably, there are many greater worlds. Why could He not create 
at least one of these worlds? So, Schellenberg concludes: 
(8) God can ensure the existence of greater worlds, and can do so limitlessly.24 
Jerome Gellman responds. He says that (8) is equivalent to: 
(E) God can ensure the existence of any world in which there is no evil.25 
If this equivalence holds, then Schellenberg’s argument does not avoid Plantinga’s Free Will 
Defence. It is possible that God was dealt a hand in which all possible creatures will go astray at 
least once if created. Were God to desire morally significant freedom, God would not be able to 
actualize a world without evil in it. So, Gellman claims that Schellenberg’s argument does not 
avoid the Free Will Defence. 
 However, Schellenberg’s argument is more sophisticated than Gellman lets on. He 
responds to Gellman by pointing out that (8) is not equivalent to (E). It might be that God cannot 
ensure the existence of certain worlds without evil, on the assumption that creatures have 
morally significant freedom, but why does that require (8) to be false? There are two types of 
                                                
23 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p. 40. It is not clear whether Schellenberg intends for (8) to mean that God can ensure the existence of some 
greater world or all greater worlds. However, no issues seem to arise from this distinction. Foreshadowing premise 
(9), if there is some greater world that God can create, in which there is no evil, why would God create a lesser 
world with evil? 
25 Jerome Gellman, p. 442, emphasis in the original. 
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worlds without evil: greater worlds and non-greater worlds that happen not to have any evil 
within them. Greater worlds, says Schellenberg, are distinct from worlds that have no evil by 
virtue of free creatures always choosing the good. Greater worlds are worlds that do not permit 
evil whatsoever. It might be that (E) is false because God cannot ensure just any world without 
evil, such as non-Greater worlds that happen to have no evil within them. But it might that (8) is 
true because God can ensure that (some) greater worlds come into existence, which, by 
definition, exist independently from worlds that permit or require evil but happen not to have evil 
in them.26 
The free will defender might fire back: But a world with morally significant freedom is a 
better world than a world without morally significant freedom. However, if morally significant 
freedom is understood in a libertarian respect, and if God does not have libertarian freedom on 
the assumptions that He is necessarily good27 and that PP is true, God will not have morally 
significant freedom.28 So, as we approach God’s level of goodness, there will be less morally 
significant freedom. So, the worlds (and goods) closest to God’s goodness will not have morally 
significant freedom.29 So, there will always be possibilities for God to create even better worlds 
without the existence of morally significant freedom. 
                                                
26 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil Revisited,” p. 467. Another objection to Gellman is that even 
if worlds with morally significant freedom are greater worlds, (8) only requires that God be able to make some 
greater worlds, not all of them. See footnote 24. 
27 See Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2002; originally published 
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991), pp. 51-64. 
28 God might make choices that are indeterminate that have no moral significance, such as choosing to place a tree in 
one spot, as opposed to one inch to the north of it. All I am saying here is that, with regard to moral actions, God 
cannot choose to do evil, so He does not have morally significant freedom, at least of the kind that allows Him the 
possibility of committing evil. 
29 Worlds here should not be understood as including God’s goodness. If God’s goodness were including in a world, 
then God’s goodness would be included in the evaluation of a world’s goodness. But, if so, God’s goodness would 
be the standard for judging a world with God’s goodness in it, in which case, no increase in value, beyond the value 
of a world with God’s goodness alone in it, would make the world better. The total value of a world can increase 
beyond God’s goodness due to valuable things being added to the value of a world in which God’s goodness is also 
present. If God’s goodness is the standard for judging worlds, we will think the additional goods to be excessive, by 
virtue of the fact that the worlds in which they exist go beyond God’s level of goodness. This should not be. We 
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In other words, if approaching God’s greatness is what it is for a world (or a good) to 
become better, then it is better for God to create a world in which there is no morally significant 
freedom in the libertarian respect, on the assumption that God has no morally significant 
freedom in the libertarian respect. After all, having morally significant freedom in the libertarian 
respect will be less like God than not having morally significant freedom in the libertarian 
respect. God either acts according to compatibilistic morally significant freedom (whatever that 
might mean) or has no morally significant freedom whatsoever. If so, and if UG holds, then 
better worlds will have less morally significant freedom of the libertarian variety.30 It is not the 
case, contrary to what Plantinga claims, that a world in which there are creatures who have 
morally significant freedom is better than a world in which creatures do not have that.31 
Therefore, surely God can create at least some greater world. Worlds that allow morally 
significant freedom of the libertarian variety are not greater worlds, and so Schellenberg does not 
need to worry about the Free Will Defence. Instead, he has us imagine greater worlds being 
worlds with an eternal progression of “awareness, experience, and embodiment of the Divine 
Person, from the least fully formed and moving up the ladder infinitely, with each finite person 
growing from there infinitely.”32 God need not create a world with libertarian freedom. He can 
create a world of pure, complete, and utter bliss in the enjoyment of God’s greatness for all 
                                                                                                                                                       
should be able to add goodness to a world beyond the value of a world in which God alone exists. Because God’s 
goodness is the standard for all value judgments of things that exist independent from God’s goodness, evaluating a 
world should not be done with God as a member of it.  
Additionally, we need not say that the value of a world is intrinsic value. All value outside of God, like modeling 
goods, might only be extrinsically and finally valuable as they participate in or model God’s goodness. This 
maintains the classical theistic belief that God is the ground for all good things. 
Finally, this does not impinge the argument against the Free Will Defence being presented here. People either have 
libertarian free will or not. But having libertarian free will is worse than not having it, by virtue of the fact that God 
does not have it and God is the standard of goodness. 
30 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” pp. 43-44. 
31 Alvin Plantinga, p. 166. 
32 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” p. 40, emphasis in the original. 
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creatures in a given world. Because of this, it is no problem for Schellenberg to conclude that (8) 
is true. 
At this point, Schellenberg argues for a new premise: 
(9) If any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling 
the corresponding pure goods in God and the existence of greater worlds can limitlessly 
be ensured by God, then for any world X that requires or permits evil, there is some 
world Y that models pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create 
X rather than Y.33 
To defend this premise, Schellenberg provides three arguments. First, he points out that evil 
causes a natural disappreciation. Not only will a world with evil be less appreciated than a world 
without evil, but a world with evil will also procure disappreciation. Second, when UG and PP 
are taken seriously, “the good of finite beings in a world including God is bound up with 
growing more fully into a multifaceted awareness of God, and this... evil could only hinder.”34 In 
other words, because God is the greatest and purest form of goodness, in whom there is no evil 
whatsoever, evil would only hinder finite creatures from coming into a greater appreciation and 
experience of His goodness. 
Third and finally, Schellenberg walks us through a thought experiment. Suppose that 
there are two divine beings, both of whom are of equal value, though one has some evil that has 
been turned to good within him. It seems right to say that the being with no evil is better than the 
one with evil, even if it is evil that has been turned to good. God would be less pure were He to 
have some evil within Him. Presumably, what he is getting at is an analogy. Suppose that there 
are two worlds, both of which are of equal value. If one world received its value from evil that 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 41. 
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had been turned to good, and the other simply had good, we would choose the latter. It matters 
that evil is present. We do not just consider the final value of a world.35 
 From (7), (8), and (9), we may conclude: 
(10) For any world X that requires or permits evil, there is some world Y that models pure 
goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y.36 
Additionally, he claims that the following is a necessary truth: 
(11) If for any world X that requires or permits evil there is some world Y that models pure 
goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y, then God 
has no good reason to permit evil in the world.37 
It follows from (10) and (11) that: 
(12) God has no good reason to permit evil in the world.38 
Finally, because God needs justification to allow evil in a world: 
(13) If there is evil in the world, then God has a good reason to permit it.39 
It follows from (12) and (13) that: 
(14) There is no evil in the world.40 
Because there is evil in the world, we must reject one of our original assumptions or give up our 
belief in God. Thus runs Schellenberg’s new LPE. Note here that, as Gellman points out, the 
conclusion of the argument is that the existence of God is inconsistent with any evil.41  
Schellenberg’s argument is highly intuitive, but there are holes in it. I begin by evaluating 
what it means for God to be the greatest possible being, after which I attack premise (6). Soon 
                                                
35 Ibid., pp. 40-42. Though Schellenberg presents other arguments in defense of (9), these are the best three. 
36 Ibid., p. 40. 




41 Jerome Gellman, p. 439. 
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after that, I will move to attack premise (9). Let us, now, evaluate what it means for God to be 
the greatest possible being. 
 12 
II. Maximal Perfection 
Both UG and perfect being theism claim that God is the greatest metaphysically possible being.42 
But what exactly does this entail? If God is the greatest possible being, how should we 
understand His properties? The following section seeks to show that some of God’s maximal 
perfections, specifically God’s maximal moral and intellectual perfections,43 are not grounded in 
outward actualizations, such as a person actually doing benevolent deeds; and, thus, are 
grounded in certain inward virtuous potentialities (or, “potentials” or “virtues” 44 for short).45 A 
virtuous potentiality is good trait of a person, whether moral or intellectual, that is so embedded 
in a person that it disposes him or her to acting or expressing himself or herself in certain good 
ways. However, virtuous potentialities are not merely dispositions. They also include inner 
capabilities. For example, God might have the potentiality of mercifulness. This indicates that He 
has (1) the capability of being merciful, and (2) the disposition to be merciful. 
There are two reasons why I include both capacities and dispositions in the description of 
a virtuous potentiality – that is, again, a “potential” or “virtue” for short. First, the language of 
“potentials” is regularly used merely to indicate capacities. However, if God’s maximal 
perfections are grounded in His inner fullness, we cannot merely say that God has a capacity to 
                                                
42 See Yujin Nagasawa, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), pp. 9-10. 
43 What I mean by “moral perfection” is the moral property of God that adds to His greatness. For example, if God’s 
moral perfection is grounded only in His virtuous potentialities, then, though He does moral actions (moral 
actualities), the actions do not add to His greatness. Only the virtuous potentials add to His greatness. “Maximal” 
qualifies the degree of greatness that God has as being at the highest level of perfection. 
Similarly, by “intellectual perfection” I mean the intellectual property of God that adds to His greatness. “Maximal” 
qualifies the degree of greatness that God has as being at the highest level of perfection. Additionally, I do not use 
the language of “omniscience” because the word technically means “all-knowing,” which I do not believe adds any 
greatness to God, as will be argued in part B. 
44 Because this paper focuses primarily upon morality, I use “virtue” primarily to refer to the moral virtues, as 
opposed to the intellectual. Thus, please note my custom for this paper. If I talk about a virtue without qualifying the 
type, I am speaking of a moral virtue. If I qualify it by saying “intellectual virtue,” I am speaking of an intellectual 
virtue. 
45 Unless otherwise specified, I will use “potential,” “virtue,” and “virtuous potentiality” interchangeably. If I need 
to designate a non-virtuous potentiality or an incapable virtue, I will make a note of it. See the following paragraphs. 
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do what is good (whether morally or intellectually). For example, God might have the capacity to 
think well, but if He has no motive to do so, then He will never think well (except, possibly, by 
accident). If God’s maximal perfections are grounded inwardly, the inner fullness needs to be 
maximal. So, God, at least, needs to be motivated to think well. But, being motivated to think 
well every now and then is still not as good as being motivated to think well all the time. Thus, I 
include dispositions in my description of a virtuous potentiality. If God’s perfections are 
grounded inwardly, then He is so disposed to doing what it is good (either morally or 
intellectually) that He will always do what is good when a relevant situation arises that allows for 
Him to do what is good according to His virtuous potentiality.46 
The second reason to use the language of “virtuous potentiality” is because it is plausible 
to suppose that virtues are merely good dispositions, not necessarily capacities.47 Someone who 
is completely disabled (or paralyzed) and unable even to perform a benevolent action might be 
incapable of acting benevolently, though disposed to it.48 Additionally, a person might have good 
thinking dispositions, but not be capable of acting on them because he or she does not have the 
cognitive power to work through difficult problems.49 In both of these situations, the person 
                                                
46 There is a debate among virtue ethicists whether virtues should be understood as “global, robust character traits” 
or as “local, situation-specific traits, such as honesty in taking exams” (Bonnie Kent, “Dispositions and Moral 
Fallibility: The Unaristotelian Aquinas,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2012), p. 141). If we determine 
that God’s virtues ground His moral perfection, we should speak of them as global traits because having global 
traits, presumably, is better than having local traits. See Nafsika Athanassoulis, “A Response to Harman: Virtue 
Ethics and Character Traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000), pp. 215-221. 
For a motivation-based account of virtue ethics, see Linda Zagzebski, “The Virtues of God and the Foundation of 
Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy 15, no. 4 (1998), pp. 538-553. 
47 Many regard virtues as having dispositions. See Linda Zagzebski, p. 541. See also Christine Swanton, Virtue 
Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 19. If a virtue is not a disposition but 
merely a character trait of lesser power that motivates imperfectly, because we are speaking of God’s maximal 
perfection, we should, nevertheless, regard His virtuous potentialities as dispositions, according to which God will 
act according to His disposition whenever a relevant situation arises. 
48 Linda Zagzebski might be willing to embrace something like this. To her, motives are the primary components of 
virtues (Zagzebski, p. 539). A disabled person might be motivated to be benevolent, but he might also be unable to 
act benevolently. 
49 See Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 29-
46. 
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seems virtuous, but incapable of acting according to his or her virtue. So, if God’s maximal 
perfections are grounded inwardly, He needs to have the capacities as well, not just the good 
dispositions. He would, otherwise, not be maximally perfect from an inner greatness that always 
produces good actions when a relevant situation arises.50  
Our question, nevertheless, of this section is whether some of His perfections are 
grounded in His virtuous potentials or in the actualizations of His (not-necessarily-virtuous) 
potentials.51 The reason for this is to establish that God actually has virtuous potentialities that 
require evil for actualization. If God’s maximal perfections are grounded in His actualizations, 
there is no reason to think that God has the virtuous potentiality of, say, mercy, which requires 
evil for actualization. Because God’s greatness will already be established on account of His 
actualizations, He will not have to be inwardly maximal. And if He does not have to be inwardly 
maximal, He does not have to have the virtuous potentiality of mercy. 
One might think that, because we are discussing the LPE, all we need is the possibility of 
God having virtuous potentialities. This correct. All I need to proceed is the possibility of God 
having virtuous potentialities that require evil. However, there is no reason to suppose that it is 
even possible for God to have virtuous potentialities that require evil, if God’s actualizations 
ground His greatness. If God, before creation, was maximally great (given UG), and if His 
greatness was entirely grounded in His actualizations, then, given PP, His actualizations, before 
creation, must have been pure and of the highest good. Nothing could surpass them. This entails, 
                                                
50 According to Bonnie Kent, Aristotle took virtues to be, in part, developed capacities (Kent, pp. 144-146). If a 
virtue is a developed capacity, that is compatible with my position. I am simply making clear what I mean by a 
virtuous potentiality in this paper. I intend for them to indicate good capacities with good dispositions. 
In part C, I will argue that dispositions have complex conditions surrounding their actualization, such that, all the 
conditions must be met before a potential can be actualized. The capacity to actualize seems to be one of these 
conditions. 
51 Remember potentials can sometimes indicate mere capacities. If God’s maximal perfections are grounded in His 
actualizations, it might be that God does not need to be inwardly maximal. Indeed, in the following sections, I argue 
that God cannot have maximal moral or intellectual actualizations, so He must be maximal inwardly, which is the 
exact reverse of God having maximal actualizations and a non-maximal inner state. 
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given that God is the standard for goodness, that all goods external to God’s maximal greatness, 
including all (virtuous) potentials (of God or creatures) and modeling goods, must be evaluated 
according to how they relate to His maximally great and pure actualizations that existed before 
creation. 
Take modeling goods as an example. If God’s perfections are grounded in actualizations, 
modeling goods, which model God’s greatness, will be pure and good actualizations (or 
something in near relation to pure and good actualizations, such as pure and good potentialities). 
If a modeling good is not pure, given the inherent repugnance of evil and given that God can 
make a greater good without any evil, as it more nearly approaches God’s maximally great and 
pure actualizations, I see no reason why God would allow such a modeling good. 
Similarly, if God’s greatness is grounded in His actualizations, and if God’s greatness is 
the standard for goodness, (virtuous) potentials (of God or creatures) will only be good insofar as 
they relate to those pure and good actualizations that existed in God prior to creation. Suppose 
that a potential produces something other than pure actualizations (such as mercy, which requires 
evil). Given the inherent repugnance of evil and given that God can make a greater good that 
does not require evil, as it more nearly approaches God’s actualizations that were pure and 
maximally great prior creation (during which “time” there was no mercy), why would God 
choose for (either a divine or creaturely) person to have it (that is, the potential that produces 
actualizations that require evil)? What reason would there be for God to want it as opposed to 
another good that more nearly aligns with God’s actualizations, such as a potential that only 
produces actualizations that do not require evil and are more nearly associated with the maximal 
actualizations that existed in God without evil prior to creation? 
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Indeed, even if God can infinitely expand the goods of the universe, I see no reason why 
God would allow in any “spot,” as it were, an evil-involving-good (or a potential whose 
actualization requires evil). For any time, for any space, for any character trait, for any thing 
whatsoever, God could fill it with a good that does not have the inherent repugnance of evil (or 
the disposition to produce an actualization that requires evil) and that more nearly approaches the 
maximally great and pure actualizations that existed in God prior to creation.  
This is the exact reason why the Free Will Defence fails. Morally significant freedom 
might be a good – indeed, it might be a very great good – but it is an arbitrary good that can 
always be exceeded. By “arbitrary good” I mean a good that has no real association with or 
grounding in God’s maximal greatness. Because it is arbitrary and because it allows evil, which 
causes natural disappreciation, there is no reason why God would choose for it to fill a “spot” in 
the world, as opposed to another good, which more nearly approaches God’s goodness and does 
not require evil. Schellenberg would claim that it was not possible for God, who is maximally 
morally perfect, to choose to embrace morally significant freedom. Once you embrace that it is 
possible for a maximally morally perfect being to choose morally significant freedom, the LPE is 
solved on account of Plantinga’s Free Will Defence. However, as it stands, there is no reason to 
posit that it is even possible, given that God would have no good reason to choose to allow 
morally significant freedom. 
So too, with regard to God’s virtuous potentials, if they are not directly associated with or 
grounded in God’s actualizations, they will be arbitrary goods. And, as I will argue in section III, 
virtuous potentialities yearn for and desire actualization. If God’s maximal perfection is 
grounded in His pure and maximal actualizations, then there will be no reason for God to choose 
to allow Himself to have virtuous potentials that require evil for actualization. Their 
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actualizations are not as great as other actualizations, but they also require evil, which naturally 
produces disappreciation. God will have no reason to choose to fill a “spot” of goodness with 
any of these actualizations, as opposed to some other actualization. And if He does not want the 
actualizations, and if unactualized potentials lead to desires that are unmet, why would God 
allow Himself (or others) to have virtuous potentials whose actualization requires evil? 
If God’s greatness is grounded in His pure actualizations, He has no need for the potential 
whose actualization requires evil in order for Him to be maximally great. Given that there can 
always be pure and better actualizations, He has no need or want for that potential’s 
actualization. Additionally, He has no desire to have unmet desires from potentials that add 
nothing to His greatness and do not lead to acceptable actualizations. So, what need or want 
would He have for the potential itself? If God’s maximal perfections are grounded in His 
actualizations, there is no reason to posit that it is even possible for God to have virtuous 
potentialities that dispose Him to actualizations that require evil. There is no possible world in 
which He, a morally and intellectually perfect being, would choose to have potentials that require 
evil for actualization, if His greatness is grounded in pure actualizations. 
The reason Schellenberg’s argument is so powerful is because it challenges the initial 
assumption that such “goods” (e.g., morally significant freedom) are actually good. To simply 
assert that it is possible for God to have virtuous potentialities begs the question. Is having, say, a 
merciful potentiality a thing that God would ever allow? On the assumption that God’s 
actualizations ground His greatness, God would neither need nor want such a potential. 
Therefore, this section is added to establish that God actually has virtuous potentialities 
that require evil for actualization. If we are able to establish that God’s perfections are grounded 
in His potentialities, then we must embrace that God has the maximal array of virtuous 
 18 
potentialities, including, but not limited to, virtuous potentials that require evil for actualization 
(e.g., mercy). From this I will be able to proceed in my argument against Schellenberg by 
arguing that it is good for God to actualize His virtuous potentials, even if they require evil. 
 
A. Maximal Moral Perfection 
Because nothing can exceed God in greatness, most philosophers will take UG to mean that God 
is, among other things, maximally morally perfect. This is one of His more important properties, 
if not His most important property.52 Taking from William Rowe, I argue that God’s maximal 
moral perfection must be grounded in His virtuous potentialities. 
If God’s maximal moral perfection is unsurpassable, and if this property is outwardly 
grounded in certain instances of God’s actions, then God will always do what is morally 
unsurpassable, lest He be surpassable in moral greatness by not doing that which is 
unsurpassable at some moment. So, to determine whether God’s maximal moral perfection is 
                                                
52 See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James Ellington (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1981); in Classics of Moral and Political Theory, fifth edition, edited by Michael 
Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), p. 947. He said: 
There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be 
regarded as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and 
whatever talents of the mind one might want to name are doubtless in many respects good and 
desirable, as are such qualities of temperament as courage, resolution, perseverance. But they can 
also become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature 
and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good (GMM, 393, emphasis in the 
original). 
See also Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, edited by Wolfgang 
Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). He notes how moral goods are necessary for the happy life: “Let us 
even join with the Pleasures of the external Senses, the Perceptions of Beauty, Order, Harmony. These are no doubt 
more noble Pleasures, and seem to inlarge [sic] the Mind; and yet how cold and joyless are they, if there be no moral 
Pleasures of Friendship, Love, and Beneficence” (Hutcheson, p. 164)? Later, he says, “Where there is no Virtue, 
there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation” (Hutcheson, p. 165). Finally, and more importantly, Hutcheson 
claims that virtue is the highest good: “we are indeed determin’d to judge Virtue with Peace and Safety, preferable 
to Virtue with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the Virtuous, the Publick-spirited, even 
in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other Enjoyments” (Hutcheson, p. 166). Soon 
thereafter, he says it even more succinctly: “Virtue is the chief Happiness in the Judgment of all Mankind” 
(Hutcheson, p. 167). 
For further discussion on the primacy of God’s maximal moral perfection, see Eric Funkhouser, “On Privileging 
God’s Moral Goodness,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006), pp. 409-422. 
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grounded in potentialities or in actualizations, we might evaluate whether the following 
conditional is true or false: If God is maximally morally perfect, then He will always do (not be) 
what is morally unsurpassable.53 
If the conditional is true, then more work will need to be done to prove the claim that 
God’s maximal moral perfection is grounded in potentialities. It might be that God’s maximal 
moral perfection is grounded in virtuous potentialities that always give rise to actualizations 
(e.g., benevolent actions) that are unsurpassable; but it might also be that God’s maximal moral 
perfection is grounded in actualizations by virtue of always doing what is morally unsurpassable. 
However, if I can show that the conditional is false, we will have proven that God’s maximal 
moral perfection is not grounded in actualizations because there will be instances in which God 
does not do what is morally unsurpassable, yet nevertheless is morally unsurpassable. If God 
sometimes does not do what is morally unsurpassable, yet is morally unsurpassable, God’s 
maximal moral perfection must be grounded in potentialities.54 
Let us begin, then, to evaluate the conditional by considering Rowe’s argument against 
the maximal moral perfection of God. He points out that if God created the world, He is not a 
                                                
53 Always doing what is morally unsurpassable is not intended to mean that God does some instance of an 
individual, morally unsurpassable action, if that is even possible. Though I doubt it is possible, let us suppose that 
within a certain action-type (e.g., bestowing grace) there is a maximum to what can be done (e.g., there is a limit to 
how much grace can be bestowed). The consequent of our conditional is not intended to mean that God always does 
some instance of an unsurpassable action (e.g., bestows grace to the maximum extent), according to what the 
maximum is within a certain action-type. No, what I mean is that God does, at every moment, a set of actions that 
cannot be surpassed in greatness, all-things-considered. The entire set of actions, what God could possibly do, at any 
moment, which could be several actions at the same time (e.g., bestowing grace and creating), is what is under 
consideration. If there is an all-things-considered, morally unsurpassable set of actions at time t, then no other set of 
actions could possibly be better for God to do at t. The idea is that, if God’s maximal moral perfection is grounded 
outwardly, at every moment there is absolutely no actualization – neither a singular action, nor several actions – that 
could possibly be better than what God does, lest He be surpassable in what grounds His moral perfection, 
preventing Him from being maximally morally perfect. 
The above description is filled with temporal language, but this should be no problem. If God is timeless, then God 
will eternally engage in one action. This one action must be unsurpassable if God’s maximal moral perfection is 
grounded in actualizations. 
54 Similarly, God’s maximal moral perfection could not be grounded in both potentialities and actualizations. If 
God’s maximal moral perfection is grounded in both, then God will be surpassable by a being who has all of God’s 
potentialities, but who also has better actualizations. 
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maximally morally perfect being because, for any world any being creates, it would have been 
possible for there to have been a being who created a morally better world, given that there is no 
best possible world and given that worlds are value commensurable in such a way that there is an 
infinite chain of better possible worlds. Rowe, then, concludes that God is not maximally 
morally perfect.55 
Let us modify this so that general action is the center of focus, not just creation: 
(15) If God is maximally morally perfect, then He will always do (not be) what is morally 
unsurpassable.56 
(16) Given that there is an infinite number of possible (sets of) actions, all of which are 
value commensurable on an infinite scale of better and worse (sets of) actions, for any 
(set of) action(s) that God does, because it is not as good as could have been done, it is 
not unsurpassably great. 
(17) So, God is not maximally morally perfect. 
Thus runs Rowe’s argument against the maximal moral perfection of God. 
However, we are arguing neither for God’s maximal moral perfection, nor against 
Rowe’s argument. Yet, Rowe’s argument provides a good launching point for an argument to 
determine that the conditional of part A (“If God is maximally morally perfect, then He will 
always do (not be) what is morally unsurpassable.”) is false. We are trying to evaluate the truth-
value of this conditional, and Rowe happens to use it within his argument as a premise. 
Additionally, because UG states that God is the greatest possible being, and because God’s 
                                                
55 William Rowe, “Can God Be Free?” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis 
Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012), pp. 115-116.  
56 He embraces this when he says, “we should say that the degree of goodness an omniscient being possesses is 
reflected in the degree of goodness in the world it creates. And what this reasoning leads us to is the conclusion 
Leibniz reached: An unsurpassably good, omnipotent, omniscient creator will create an unsurpassably good world” 
(Rowe, “Can God Be Free?” p. 123). 
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maximal moral perfection is one of the central perfections of God’s nature, we have already 
assumed that God is maximally morally perfect and that the conclusion of Rowe’s argument is 
false.  
Given these considerations, we can perform a G.E. Moore shift:57 
(18) God is maximally morally perfect. 
(19) Given that there is an infinite number of possible (sets of) actions, all of which are 
value commensurable on an infinite scale of better and worse (sets of) actions, for any 
(set of) action(s) that God does, because it is not as good as could have been done, it is 
not unsurpassably great. 
(20) So, it is not the case that if God is maximally morally perfect, then He will always do 
(not be) what is morally unsurpassable. 
Notice that in both (15) – (17) and (18) – (20), premises (16) and (19) are the same. So, we have 
two mutually exclusive, possible conjunctions that can be accepted if (16) and (19) are true: 
(21) God is maximally morally perfect, and God does not have to do what is unsurpassably 
great to be maximally morally perfect. 
(22) God must do what is unsurpassably great to be maximally morally perfect, and God is 
not maximally morally perfect. 
On our assumption that God is maximally morally perfect (from UG and from the fact that one 
of God’s central properties is His moral goodness), (21) must be true. 
However, we may ask, are (16) and (19) true? I agree with Rowe that they are. There are 
three possibilities. At any given moment, either (1) there is exactly one best and unsurpassable 
possible (set of) action(s), or (2) there is not. If (2), then either (2a) there are a number of 
                                                
57 For more on G.E. Moore shifts, see William Rowe, “The Inductive Argument from Evil Against the Existence of 
God,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: 
Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012), pp. 311-312. 
 22 
possible (sets of) actions God could do, each of which is morally unsurpassable, or (2b) there is 
no unsurpassable possible (set of) action(s).58 Though (1) and (2a) might initially seem plausible, 
because God can always add to the quantity of goods, there is no cap on the value of actions. So, 
there is no morally unsurpassable (set of) action(s) whatsoever. (1) and (2a) are false. Let me 
explain this point further. 
Before creating,59 God can choose to create one person, or two people, or three people, 
and so on, ad infinitum. And if it is better to have two people than one person, and three people 
in the world is better than two, there really is no unsurpassable possible world, and so no 
unsurpassable possible action with regard to creation. For any possible world, God can always 
add to it by creating more good things. And if the quantity of goods in a world can always be 
increased, God can always do better actions. Instead of creating n number of good things, He can 
always create n + 1 good things. The latter action would be better than the former. As these 
actions increase in greatness ad infinitum, there cannot be a cap on how great actions can be. 
But creating is not the only type of action. Maybe in a given state of affairs in which 
everyone is evil, God can display grace to one person, or to two people, or to three – and we are 
off on the same train of thought again. The action of showing grace to one person is exceeded in 
greatness by the action(s) of showing grace to two people. Just like with creation, showing grace 
to someone can always be exceeded by some other (set of) actions. Because increasing the 
number of beneficiaries that receive grace can increase ad infinitum, actions can increase ad 
infinitum. 
                                                
58 William Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom,” in Reasoned Faith, edited by Eleonore Stump 
(Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 231. Though Rowe was talking about possible worlds, the same idea can be 
applied to actions. 
59 This act of creation does not necessarily have to be the first act of creation, but could be an act of creation after the 
initial act of creation. 
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Even if we suppose that God cannot do better for some parts of the universe, presumably 
God can do better for other parts of the universe. And even if we suppose that all of our universe 
cannot be increased in greatness, presumably God can create another universe that is causally 
separate from our universe, increasing the total amount of goodness that there is in reality. God 
can always do something that makes reality better. And if God can always do something more to 
make reality better, then there will always be a better moral (set of) action(s) that God can do.60 
 If this is true, then (16) and (19) are true, in which case, because God is maximally 
morally perfect, we must infer that our conditional is false. It is not the case that if God is 
maximally morally perfect, then He will always do what is morally unsurpassable. At the very 
least, there is one (set of) action(s) that God has done that is not as great as could have been 
done, namely when He created this world. He could have made a better world, which entails that 
He did not do what was morally unsurpassable at that moment, which would make the 
conditional false. Nevertheless, there is no unsurpassable (set of) action(s) whatsoever in any 
respect. 
Because God does not do what is unsurpassable, yet remains maximally morally perfect, 
God’s maximal moral perfection must not be grounded in actualizations. If so, it must be 
grounded in potentialities. Rather than actualizations, there must something deeper that 
                                                
60 If there is no value commensurability whatsoever, then talk of God doing the (un)surpassable is philosophically 
inappropriate because (un)surpassability requires value comparison. However, it does seem that at least some 
version of value commensurability is true. If overall value commensurability, according to which every action can 
be measured against every other action – if this is not true, then we can weaken the commensurability claim to every 
action being measurable against at least some other action of the same action-type, and the argument seems to run 
the same. A rejection of overall value commensurability does not entail that nothing is value commensurable, only 
that some things cannot be compared to certain other things. If so, then, though we might not be able to compare 
God’s actions of action-type x to actions of action-type y, we might be able to say that one action within action-type 
x is better than another action of action-type x. And, presumably, for some action-types, there are an infinite number 
of increasingly better actions. For example, though we might not be able to compare God’s creation of a world to 
God’s bestowal of grace, within the action-type of creating a world, there are infinitely better worlds God could 
create; and within the action-type of bestowing grace, all things being equal, bestowing grace to person p and p’ 
seems better than bestowing grace only to p. See Yujin Nagasawa’s similar comments concerning the radial and 
linear models of God’s greatness in Maximal God, pp. 40-76. 
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constitutes His goodness, something that is immutable, unchanging, and unsurpassably great, 
something like His character, His virtuous dispositions, or His moral potentialities.61 
We can see this conclusion further when we evaluate the following scenario. Consider 
Sally, a benevolent young woman. She is completely disposed to loving others, such that, if a 
person were to come into contact with her, she would dedicate her time, energy, and resources to 
helping that person or making that person’s life better. However, let us suppose that there is no 
one else alive where she lives. Maybe she lives in a desert or on deserted island, or maybe God 
brought her into a universe by herself. Nevertheless, she never meets another person to be 
benevolent towards, and, because of this, she never actualizes her benevolent potentiality. If 
actualizations ground moral goodness, she would not be a morally good person (at least, with 
regard to being benevolent), even though she had a benevolent virtue. This seems wrong. My 
intuitions tell me that she would be a morally good person. Her moral goodness, grounded in her 
character, simply was unable to be exercised.  
Going further, let us suppose that, all-things-being-equal, Sally one day comes into 
contact with someone, and she actualizes her potentials. “Finally,” she says, “there is somebody 
to love.” Would we thereby conclude that her moral goodness was established by virtue of now 
having her potentials actualized? My intuitions tell me that there would be no difference in her 
moral goodness. She would still be the same morally good person that she was prior to having 
met someone and having actualized her potentials. The only difference would be that, by 
actualizing her potentials, she was finally able to express her inner goodness. 
A similar scenario can be depicted, according to which there are two women, identical in 
moral character, living slightly different lives, such that one of them, by pure happenstance, 
actualizes her potentials just a bit more than the other. I would not conclude that one was morally 
                                                
61 See Yujin Nagasawa’s similar argument in Maximal God, pp. 32-33, 107-108, 156-157, 203-204. 
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better than the other. Yet, we would have to conclude that one was morally better than the other 
if actualizations ground moral goodness. One of the women might have performed more morally 
good deeds than the other, but they both had equal moral worth. 
At this point, one might ask: Why do we regard actualizations as so important when 
evaluating the moral goodness of a person if they do not ground anyone’s moral goodness? The 
reason is because actualizations are the only epistemic means through which we can evaluate a 
person’s inner moral worth. David Hume said it best: 
’Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that 
produc’d them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain 
principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We 
must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and 
therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are 
still consider’d as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is 
the motive, that produc’d them (Treatise, 3.2.1.2).62 
 
Hume understood that actions are epistemically necessary to evaluate the moral goodness of a 
person. They are not necessary for a person actually to be morally good. And, of course, because 
there is no unsurpassable (set of) action(s), God’s surpassable actions are unreliable signs of His 
inner unsurpassable moral greatness. 
Therefore, given everything that has been said, we should conclude that God’s maximal 
moral perfection is grounded in His inner virtuous potentialities. 
 
B. Maximal Intellectual Perfection 
Through an examination of one of God’s other maximal perfections, we can support the 
argument presented in part A. In doing so, we will be able to see the distinction between the 
                                                
62 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 307. Of course, having a singular motive is not as good as having a virtuous disposition 
that disposes one to do what is good in all relevant situations. 
 26 
result of God’s potentialities and the potentialities themselves, and to say that the greatness of 
God is not grounded in the results of but in the possession of the virtuous potentialities. 
Take God’s maximal intellectual perfection. One might try to say that maximal 
intellectual perfection is having an unsurpassable bank of knowledge. However, similar to the 
above, if we evaluate maximal intellectual perfection by how much knowledge God actually has, 
then there will always be another being who could have had more than He. For any given world, 
there is always another world that allows God to have more knowledge. For example, let us 
suppose that the actual world W has n number of grains of sand. From this, there is clearly 
another possible world W’ in which there is n + 1 grains of sand. Though this might be trivial, 
and though this might not add to the value of the world, it still increases God’s knowledge bank. 
And because this can be done infinitely many times, God’s knowledge can expand infinitely. 
One response to this is that that there is an intrinsic maximum to God’s knowledge. For 
example, we might say that the intrinsic maximum of perfect knowledge is: “For any 
proposition, [a maximally intellectually perfect] being knows whether it is true or false.”63 
Though this might be true, it is irrelevant to the comparison between God’s greatness in the 
actual world and the greatness of some other being in a possible world if maximal intellectual 
perfection is grounded in the possession of knowledge. Suppose that it is true in W that, for 
being G, for any proposition, G knows whether it is true or false, and that there are n grains of 
sand. Suppose further that it is true in W’ that, for being G’, for any proposition, G’ knows 
whether it is true or false, and that there are n + 1 grains of sand, all else being equal. Though 
both beings might satisfy the above claim of what is required (not necessarily sufficient) to be 
                                                
63 Louis Pojman and Michael Rea, “The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God,” in Philosophy of 
Religion: An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage 
Learning, 2012), p. 138. See footnote 43 for my reason concerning why I exchange “a maximally intellectually 
perfect” for “an omniscient”. 
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maximally intellectually perfect, if maximal intellectual perfection is grounded in the possession 
of knowledge, we can still say that G’ is more knowledgeable and, so, intellectually greater than 
G because G’ possesses more knowledge by virtue of that one extra grain of sand that is known. 
Indeed, the same could be said for those with infinite knowledge. Presumably, an infinite 
can be expanded and increased. For example, the set of all natural numbers is a greater infinite 
than the set of all natural numbers that are only even. Because of this, G in W might have infinite 
knowledge, yet G’ in W’ might also have infinite knowledge. However, because of the increased 
number of propositions that can be known (and are known) within W’ compared to W, G’ is 
greater in knowledge than G.64 
At this point, we would surely not want to say that God’s maximal intellectual perfection 
is grounded, at least purely, in the actual possession of knowledge, lest there be a possible being 
who is more knowledgeable and, thus, a greater possible being than God in the actual world. No, 
what we should say is that maximal intellectual perfection is at least partially grounded in 
something more than the actual possession of knowledge. In other words, we ought not to say 
that God’s greatness is grounded in merely extrinsic properties of God that can fluctuate as the 
world around Him changes, such as the number of propositions that can be known. To some 
degree, we need to regard His greatness in terms of something else. A good possibility is that He 
has intellectual virtues that ground part of His value. 
What the above definition of maximal intellectual perfection (“For any proposition, [a 
maximally intellectually perfect] being knows whether it is true or false.”) might have been 
trying to convey was something along the following lines: x is maximally intellectually perfect 
                                                
64 It might be that the two infinite banks of knowledge are actually equal in size, given that they can be placed in 
one-to-one correspondence with one another. I assume that one-to-one correspondence does not entail the sameness 
of size. For more on the concept of infinity, see Paul Draper, “A Critique of the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” in 
Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, 
Cengage Learning, 2012), pp. 172-178.  
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iff x has the property such that x will directly, immediately, and unfailingly65 know the truth-
value of any proposition. Suppose that there are n grains of sand at time t and that God knows at 
t that there are n grains of sand. Suppose further that He creates n’ grains of sand in addition to n 
at t + 1. At t + 1, He will know that there are n + n’ grains of sand because His intellectual 
virtues provides Him this knowledge, by whatever process that might be. 
Indeed, God’s maximal intellectual perfection might be mainly grounded in the continual 
exercise of one of His powers. Thomas Senor thinks something similar to this. He says, “X is 
[maximally intellectually perfect] iff X has fully-exercised maximal cognitive power.”66 
Whatever it is, God having the property of maximal intellectual perfection is not grounded 
purely in the number of proposition God actually knows, but also in the never-failing and 
virtuous ability to know the truth-value of any proposition. God’s knowledge is not fully 
grounded in the actual possession of knowledge, but also in the potential possession of 
knowledge through having the virtuous ability to come to know directly, immediately, and 
unfailingly whatever may come to pass. 
Yet, we run into the same issue as before. Potentially, there are two possible beings, both 
of which have fully-exercised maximal cognitive power, but one has more knowledge than the 
other because it lives in a world with more propositions than can be known. The only way to 
maintain that God is the greatest possible being is to say that God’s maximal intellectual 
perfection is not at all grounded in the possession of knowledge, an extrinsic property of God 
that is dependent upon factors external to Him, namely how many propositions can be known, 
                                                
65 “Direct” indicates that God does not require a medium to come to know anything. For example, He does not 
require someone telling Him that y to know that y. “Immediately” indicates that knowing y happens at the moment 
in which y can be known. “Unfailingly” indicates that no failure occurs in the acquisition of knowledge, either (1) in 
falsely believing a proposition, (2) in not knowing a proposition, or (3) through a cognitive mechanism messing up. 
66 Thomas Senor, “Omniscience and the Problem of Foreknowledge and Freedom,” unpublished work provided for 
his Fall 2018, Philosophy of Religion class (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas), p. 3. See footnote 43 
for my reason concerning why I exchange “maximally intellectually perfect” for “omniscient.” 
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and that it is only grounded in an inward virtuous potentiality of God that produces knowledge as 
its actualization. 
This is not to say that God does not know all things that can be known or that God could 
possibly be ignorant of certain things. No, all I am claiming is that God’s maximal intellectual 
perfection is not itself grounded in His knowledge. His perfect knowledge is the effect of His 
maximal intellectual perfection being actualized. Whenever there is something to be known, God 
comes to know it directly, immediately, and unfailingly.67 
 
C. Summary and Objections to God’s Maximal Perfections Being Grounded in Potentials 
To summarize, let us transition back to God’s maximal moral perfection. At every moment, we 
can imagine God doing one more caring act. Even actions that can be done fully (just as one can 
know all things fully), such as obeying all duties one has or maintaining the laws of nature, can 
be exceeded. Even though we normally think of a person either fulfilling all of his duties or not, 
we can always imagine another world in which he fulfills one more duty by virtue of having one 
more duty to fulfill and by obeying it.68 Even though we normally think of God as either fully 
maintaining the laws of nature or not, we can always imagine another world in which there is one 
more law of nature, such that, in that other world, God does better by maintaining more laws of 
nature. 
                                                
67 Note the similarity with moral dispositions. Nafsika Athanassoulis said the following: “Full virtue requires that 
one is kind and compassionate in all circumstances where this is the appropriate behavior, no matter how difficult it 
is to do so, and that one should act effortlessly, no matter how many temptations there are to do otherwise” 
(Athanassoulis, p. 219). Just like moral virtues, which ground God’s maximal moral perfection, will lead to virtuous 
action whenever a relevant circumstance arises in which virtuous action can take place; so too God’s intellectual 
virtues, which ground His maximal intellectual perfection, will lead to knowledge whenever a relevant circumstance 
arises in which intellectual exercise can take place. I will talk about this more in the upcoming section. 
68 This is not to say that God has duties that He fails to fulfill. This only means that God has more duties in another 
possible world, such that, though, for every possible world, God fulfills all duties that He has, He fulfills more duties 
in another possible world than He does in the actual world, assuming that He has some duties in the actual world. 
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Thus, God’s maximal moral perfection is not grounded in the actual performance of 
morally good actions at all, but only in the potential performance of morally good actions. In 
other words, God has all the virtuous character traits, all of which are good to the maximal 
extent, having both the capacity and the disposition to do what is good, such that, whenever a 
relevant situation arises in which the virtuous potential can be actualized, God actualizes it. He is 
fully just, He is fully merciful, He is fully gracious, and He is fully loving. He is wholly virtuous, 
possessing the maximal array of virtues, each of which is fully capable of actualization and fully 
disposes God to actualization. These virtuous character traits, in addition to God lacking any vice 
– that is, any bad disposition, inclination, character trait, or potentiality (such as being unjust or 
cowardly)69 – are the sole sources of God’s maximal moral perfection. God’s maximal moral 
perfection is not grounded in His actions, but in His virtues; in His potentialities, not in His 
actualizations. From these potentialities, moral actualizations flow. 
It should be noted here that there is a similarity and difference between God’s moral and 
intellectual actualizations. At every moment, there is a practical cap (not a metaphysical cap) for 
intellectual actualizations, in that, in a given world, God can know all things that can be known 
in that world, but He cannot have more knowledge while in that world because there are only so 
many propositions that can be known in a given world. Even though God’s intellectual 
actualizations do not ground His perfection, due to the fact that there is always another possible 
world with another piece of knowledge that can be known, such that there is always another 
                                                
69 René Descartes said that the ability to deceive is a good, but the will to deceive is an evil. If so, we can modify my 
claim to say that God has no ill will, even though He possesses the capacity to do what is evil. See his Meditations 
on First Philosophy, second edition, edited by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 
43 (AT 53). I embrace that God is necessarily good and, thus, in a way, incapable of doing evil. However, this 
incapability might be derived from God never having the will, not from God lacking the inner capacity. See Thomas 
Aquinas, “Is God’s Power Limited?” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis Pojman 
and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012), p. 88. See also the debate between Eric 
Funkhouser and Thomas Senor. The former’s article is “On Privileging God’s Moral Goodness,” and the latter’s 
article is “God’s Goodness Needs No Privilege: A Reply to Funkhouser,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006), pp. 
423-431. 
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being with more intellectual actualization than He; in any given world, there is a cap for how 
much can be known in that world. God’s virtuous intellectual potentialities always produce full 
and complete knowledge regarding what can be known in whatever world God exists. Similarly, 
there is a practical cap (not a metaphysical cap) on how much one can obey obligations. Even 
though God’s moral actualizations do not ground His perfection, due to the fact that there is 
always another possible world in which there is another duty to obey, such that there is always 
another being with more duties fulfilled; in any given world, there is a cap for how much one can 
obey in that world. In other words, for any given world, regarding His knowledge and 
obligations, God can do what is maximally great in that world. His maximal perfections cause 
Him to do what is practically maximal. 
However, God’s moral actualizations differ from His intellectual actualizations, in that 
God cannot do, within any given world, a maximal amount of non-obligatory good deeds. For 
example, He could create one person, or two people, or three people – and so on, ad infinitum. 
Thus, though, when a relevant situation arises, God’s potentials always cause Him to do what is 
practically maximal in a given world when such a practical maximum can be reached, with 
regard to the things in a given world that He cannot practically do to a maximal extent (such as 
doing non-obligatory good deeds), His moral potentials do not cause Him to do what is maximal. 
In other words, when there is no maximal actualization, His moral potentials dispose Him to do 
something that is good in every relevant situation, but the good thing will not be maximally 
good. In any given situation, His maximal perfections cause Him to do what is maximal when 
there is a maximal that can be done in that given world, but when there is no maximal for a given 
set of actions, His potentials cause Him to do something that is (non-maximally) good. 
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Additionally, I do not think that God’s inability alone to choose what is maximal justifies 
God in choosing a world with evil-involving-goods. One might think, Well, the LPE is solved 
because God simply has to choose some good world, right? However, evil is naturally 
repugnant, and God can always choose a better world without such evil, something that is more 
closely aligned with His pure maximal greatness. For any “spot” of goodness there is, God has 
no reason to choose anything less than a good intimately grounded in His pure nature, even 
though there might be infinite spots of goodness. What we need is something fundamental to 
God’s goodness that, as it were, calls out for a world with evil, such that, the highest and purest 
good that could possibly be, demands of God that He make a world in which evil exists. In this, 
God would not be choosing an arbitrary evil-involving-good – that is, an evil-involving-good 
with no real connection to God’s goodness. God would be choosing an evil-involving-good that 
is intimately grounded in His own fundamental goodness. Potentialities, as I will argue in section 
III, create within virtue-bearers yearnings for actualization, even if the actualizations require evil. 
 Nevertheless, someone might object to God’s maximal perfections being grounded in 
virtuous potentialities by pointing out that there is no limit, for example, to how just or merciful 
one can be. Presumably, any potentiality can grow in strength ad infinitum, which would make 
potentialities just as susceptible to the above critique as actualities are. Why, for example, could 
God not be exceeded in justness by having a virtue of justness that is of greater strength? Why, 
for example, could God not be exceeded in intellectual greatness by having a potentiality that is 
of greater strength, either in disposition or in capability? 
 However, this objection does not work on God’s maximal intellectual perfection at least, 
in which God’s cognitive facilities always produce perfect knowledge. I cannot imagine a being 
having more intellectual strength than a being who has the potentiality such that He directly, 
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immediately, and unfailingly comes to know all things that there are to know. How could His 
intellectual “strength” be greater? It produces knowledge of necessity when it is actualized. So, 
even if we cannot rescue God’s moral potentialities, at the least we have one potentiality that is 
not susceptible to the same critique that actualities are. 
Yet, someone might point out that overdetermination is possible. Maybe there is a being 
who directly, immediately, and unfailingly comes to know all things through the possession of 
two separate powers, each of which produce knowledge directly, immediately, and unfailingly. 
And, the number of mechanisms in the mind of a divine being is subject to the same actualization 
problem presented above. God could have one faculty that produces knowledge directly, 
immediately, and unfailingly, but another possible being could have two faculties. Another could 
have three. And we are off on the same train of thought as before. 
But, I struggle to see how this argument concerning overdetermination provides any 
ground for rejecting my theory. On the assumption that potentials ground perfection, having 
more faculties that do the same thing is not a good that can add to any being’s greatness. It is 
useless if the only thing that it does is overdetermine a divine being having knowledge. Why 
would a useless mechanism be a great-making property? It might be a property that decreases 
greatness! After all, it is useless, and why would a perfect being (one who is regularly thought to 
be utterly simple)70 have a useless mechanism? One might think that it can act as a “backup” in 
case one of God’s mechanisms fails, but God is not thought of as having mechanisms that can 
fail in the sense of them ceasing from working as they are intended. So, properties that 
overdetermine do not add to the greatness of a being in any way, on the assumption that 
perfection is grounded in virtuous potentialities. 
                                                
70 Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God, pp. 113-118. 
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This is different from the actualization of knowledge, which is actually a good. Let us 
assume that actualizations ground perfection. Because knowledge can grow infinitely, and 
because it is a good, if actualizations ground the perfection of God, there will always be a greater 
possible being, such that there will always be a being who can surpass God in greatness. The 
difference is manifest. If actualizations ground perfection, unless we arbitrarily include some 
actualizations and exclude others, we cannot ignore any actualization. If potentials ground 
perfection, unless we arbitrarily include some potentials and exclude others, we cannot ignore 
any potential. But when we include every actual in our calculation of greatness, there will always 
be another possible being who can be greater than God by virtue of the fact that certain 
actualizations, such as knowledge, can add greatness ad infinitum to a being as the knowledge 
increases. But overdetermined faculties do not add greatness to a being – and possibly decrease a 
being’s greatness due to it being a useless faculty – so even if we include them in our calculation, 
they will not cause any problem for my theory due to the fact that they cannot cause an infinite 
increase in greatness. So overdetermination is not a problem.71 
 But, what can be said regarding God’s maximal moral perfection? Unlike God’s 
intellectual potentials, which directly, immediately, and unfailingly produces their effects, an 
objector might think that moral virtues are different. One might think that they do not always 
produce their effects. A just and merciful judge, for example, might act in one case justly by 
sentencing a criminal to a full and fair sentence, but in another case he might temper his justice 
with mercy. A judge who is just does not always sentence according to perfect justice, and a 
merciful judge does not always sentence according to perfect mercy. So, the response made for 
God’s maximal intellectual perfection does not work for His virtues. They do not always produce 
directly, immediately, and unfailingly. One can increase in strength to overcome another. 
                                                
71 Keep this idea in mind. In section III, I will use the idea of uselessness to object to Schellenberg’s argument. 
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However, this misunderstands virtues. Virtues are dispositions in which the possessor of 
a virtue will act virtuously in given circumstances.72 If they are not, at least God, being 
maximally morally perfect, has maximal dispositions, such that they always give rise to good 
actions in relevant circumstances.73 Nevertheless, the problem is that dispositions are rather 
vague. Classic examples of dispositions initially seem to be straightforward, but are not as simple 
as they first appear. For example, glass is usually thought of as having the disposition to break 
when struck. Whenever the situation arises in which glass is struck, the glass will break.74 
Yet, not every instance of a piece of glass being struck will lead to it breaking, which is a 
problem if dispositions always produce certain effects in certain circumstances. For example, it 
might be the case that a piece of glass has packing material around it, preventing the striking of 
the glass from causes it to break. We must add more detail to our description of the disposition if 
we are to ensure that the effect will arise. We might say (1) that glass without packing material 
around it has the disposition to break when struck or (2) that glass has the disposition to break 
when struck and when packing material is not around it. Yet, if dispositions require that their 
effects are produced in certain circumstances, as is normally thought,75 then dispositions will 
continually get more specific to avoid counterexamples. For example, in order to avoid the glass 
not breaking after being struck when the laws of nature are not constant or when a supernatural 
                                                
72 See footnotes 47 and 67. See Nafsika Athanassoulis, pp. 215 and 218. See Bonnie Kent, pp. 141, 149-150. Kent 
claims that Aristotle embraced that “virtues are one-sided, with choice built into them... We cannot choose contrary 
to our own moral dispositions because choice is itself the effect of our moral dispositions” (Kent, p. 150). Though 
Aristotle’s position might be disputable, this seems correct for God at least. See the rest of this paragraph and 
footnote 73.  
73 Linda Zagzebski says, “God’s motives are perfect, and his success is perfect as well. God is, therefore, not just 
reliable, he is perfectly reliable. A divine virtue, then, is the combination of a perfect motive with perfect success in 
bringing about the end of the motive” (Zagzebski, p. 545). Though in an endnote she hesitates to analyze exactly 
what this means, it seems clear that, if God is fully motivated to do an action, and if God is fully reliable in bringing 
about what He intends, His virtues will never fail to give rise to relevant action in relevant situations. 
74 Jesse R. Steinberg, “Dispositions and Subjunctives,” Philosophical Studies 148, no. 3 (2010), pp. 323-325. 
75 Ibid. 
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force intervenes, we will have to add to the above disposition description for glass that the laws 
of nature stay the same and that no supernatural force prevents it from breaking when struck.76 
If virtues are dispositions, and if dispositions always produce their effects in certain 
circumstances, it is not clear exactly how we are to supplement the description of virtuous 
dispositions to make it the case that they always produce their effects.77 Why was it that the 
judge acted, say, justly, instead of mercifully? I am not sure, but it probably has something to do 
with a mixture of his motives, desires, values, and beliefs. The conditions for mercy, whatever 
those might have been, were simply not met. The judge had the disposition of mercy; it simply 
remained dormant in the given scenario. We have to be aware that virtues, just like all other 
dispositions, have certain conditions surrounding their actualization. 
If there are complex circumstantial constraints on every virtue, then virtues genuinely are 
direct, immediate, and unfailing at producing action that is virtuous in relevant situations. They 
never fail to produce their effects. They simply have complex circumstantial constraints. If so, I 
am not sure how God could have “stronger” virtues. His virtues of necessity produce their effects 
when certain conditions arise. How could God have a stronger virtue when His virtues already 
produce directly, immediately, and unfailingly? Similarly, having two dispositions toward justice 
will simply overdetermine God. A second virtue of justness will be useless when He already has 
the virtue of justness that causes Him directly, immediately, and unfailingly to act justly in 
certain circumstances. This does not add any greatness to God. Thus, all of God’s potentialities 
discussed in this paper are not subject to the actualization problem.   
The above account leads to a second objection. Why regard God as fully just if He has 
certain conditions surrounding His virtue of justice? To this I point out that there are conditions 
                                                
76 Ibid., pp. 325-328. 
77 Ibid., p. 326-328. 
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surrounding God’s other dispositional perfections as well. God’s potentialities do not simply 
actualize on their own. Certain conditions must be met. There must be something to be known 
for His intellectual potentials to be actualized. Without a new fact to be known, God’s 
intellectual powers do nothing. This does not remove them from being present. God still has His 
cognitive powers and His intellectual dispositions, but He might not being exercising them at a 
particular time. Why is the same not true for God’s moral virtues? There are certain conditions 
that lead to the actualization of a virtuous potentiality, and there are other conditions that do not 
lead to the actualization of a virtuous potentiality. 
However, the objector might continue. Okay, sure, God might have certain conditions 
that must be met before His potentials are actualized, but the condition for full potentials to be 
actualized is simply being in a situation in which it is possible for the potential to be actualized. 
For example, a fully disposed cognitive power will produce knowledge whenever there is a 
context in which it is possible for it to produce knowledge. So, if God is supposed to be fully just, 
God will act justly in every context in which it is possible for a just action to be done; and if God 
is fully merciful, God will act mercifully in every context in which it is possible for a merciful 
action to be done. But, this cannot be because sometimes justice and mercy conflict in situations 
in which it is possible for one to be either just or merciful.  
To this I have three responses. First, as is customary among perfect being theists, we can 
simply maintain that God has the greatest possible array of compossible great-making 
properties.78 Because there are sometimes conflicts between the two virtues (both of which are 
great-making properties), it might be that God is simply not fully just or not fully merciful. He 
might be fully just and almost fully merciful so that in situations in which justice and mercy 
conflict, He will act justly. Or, He might be fully merciful and almost fully just so that in 
                                                
78 Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God, p. 35. 
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situations in which mercy and justice conflict, He will act mercifully. This would maintain the 
thesis that potentials provide a maximum in which God’s maximal greatness can be grounded, 
but would not cause any conflicts. 
Second, why think that there is only one condition surrounding the actualization of full 
potentials, namely it being possible for the potential to be actualized? The objector states that in 
every situation in which one could possibly be just, one will be just. However, why can we not 
include in the conditions for a full disposition to be actualized – why can we not include that 
there is no conflict with another full disposition? 
For a simplistic example, suppose that there is a stone that is being held. Stones have the 
disposition to move downward when possible, such that, whenever it is possible for the stone to 
move downward (e.g., it is not being held or prevented from moving downward by a solid 
object), it moves downward. Yet, we would be remiss if we did not also consider that there might 
be an opposing force that pulls the stone upward. Maybe the stone is being held exactly between 
two equidistant planets. So, once the person lets go of the stone, the gravitational force keeps it 
where it is. It would not move downward simply because it was possible. 
Of course, the stone is not a person with choice, whereas God is. When there is conflict 
between full dispositions, it might be that what is done comes down to personal choice. So, I see 
no reason why we cannot say that full dispositions automatically actualize when it is possible for 
them to be actualized and when there is no conflict with another full disposition, but that when 
there is conflict, choice matters. 
Third, it might be that a just virtue is only a virtue when supplemented by virtues that are 
merciful. It might be that there is a meta-virtue upon which (all) other virtues are dependent in 
such a way that, unless one is disposed according to its (the meta-virtue’s) mean, one cannot be 
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virtuous in other capacities. For example, if one breaks the meta-virtue by, say, having too much 
justness, then any non-meta-virtue, such as mercifulness, ceases from being a virtue; or, if one 
breaks the meta-virtue by having too much mercifulness, then any non-meta-virtue, such as 
justness, fails to be virtuous. Virtues might become vices when not balanced with other virtues. 
Indeed, this echoes a thought that Aristotle had concerning the reciprocity of the virtues: 
“nobody can have any moral virtue without practical wisdom, nor can anyone have practical 
wisdom without all the moral virtues.”79 If so, then one can be fully just and fully merciful 
without any conflict. The meta-virtue requires a balance between the two. 
Recall that the objector claimed that full justice always leads to just action when it is 
possible for one to act justly; and that full mercy always leads to merciful action when it is 
possible for one to act mercifully. There are two ways my meta-virtue theory answers this 
objection. First, the balance between justness and mercifulness might entail being disposed more 
to justice than mercy, or vice versa. Whenever there is conflict between justice and mercy, 
though a person might be fully just and fully merciful by virtue of being in balance, if the 
balanced ratio of justness to mercifulness entails that one has, at is were, more justness than 
mercifulness, then he will act justly when there is conflict. 
                                                
79 Bonnie Kent, pp. 141-142, emphasis in the original. See also Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction, 
second edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), pp. 276-277. It should be noted that 
Timmons distinguishes between two unity theses. The first is what he calls the reciprocity of virtues, according to 
which, whenever a person has one virtue, she also has all the other virtues. The second is the single-virtue thesis, 
according to which all virtues are the same. Though I do not embrace the single-virtue thesis (given that justice and 
mercy conflict), I do embrace that there is a central or supreme virtue. I take this to be (wise) love. This might be the 
grounding for the meta-virtue of justice and mercy. Because love acts in different ways at different times as the 
circumstances demand, a just and merciful judge might be able to act with full and pure justice in one instance, but 
full and pure mercy in another instance. Indeed, Francis Hutcheson maintained that morality is grounded in 
benevolence, which suggests that he is operating from a virtue ethical framework. Yet, because, according to 
Hutcheson, universal benevolence aims at maximizing the greatest happiness for the greatest number, there might be 
situations in which acting justly is better than acting mercifully, and vice versa, depending upon which action leads 
to more happiness. See Hutcheson, pp. 116 and 125. For the single-virtue thesis, see Mark Timmons, p. 277. For 
care ethics as a version of virtue ethics, see Mark Timmons, pp. 282-288. See also Margaret A. McLaren, “Feminist 
Ethics: Care as a Virtue,” in Feminists Doing Ethics, edited by Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
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The second way to avoid the objection, and the answer I prefer, is by noting that the 
meta-virtue might require the descriptions of the dispositions of justness and mercifulness to 
have an extra condition for actualization. Without this condition, a person will have too much 
justness or too much mercifulness, making them vices. So, to be (virtuously) fully just or fully 
merciful, each virtue must have an extra condition for actualization, in addition to the condition 
that one is in a situation in which it is possible to act on the virtue. More specifically, the meta-
virtue might require for the virtue of, say, justness to have the following dispositional condition: 
Act justly only if, in balance, either one has acted, is acting, or will act mercifully. It might be 
that the meta-virtue requires that full justice let mercy take over at times, and it might be that the 
meta-virtue requires that full mercy let justice take over at times. They might be in balance, not 
by pure motivational force, but by allowing the other virtue to act. 
By this, I am not necessarily claiming that every action is both just and merciful. In other 
words, my meta-virtue theory does not say that when a person acts justly, she does not fully 
exercise justice in order also to have some mercy within the action; or that when a person acts 
mercifully, she does not fully exercise mercy in order also to have some justice within the action. 
I am simply saying that when the virtues of justice and mercy are in balance, they each have an 
extra dispositional condition that requires also acting in balance in some respect. Sometimes a 
just and merciful judge will sentence a man to bear his punishment fully and fairly. That criminal 
will bear his crime in perfect justice. And other times that same judge will act from mercy by 
either not sentencing a criminal at all or lessening his sentence. In the former case, the judge will 
act in perfect mercy, whereas in the latter he will act both from partial justice and partial mercy. I 
am not claiming that the meta-virtue requires people to act from partial justice and partial mercy 
at all times. I am claiming that the meta-virtue requires some sort of balance in action, which 
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might entail acting partially from justice and partially from mercy, or acting sometimes 
according to full justice and other times according to full mercy.  
Is the meta-virtue ad hoc? I think not. First, this follows the virtue ethical traditions of the 
doctrine of the mean and the reciprocity of the virtues. The only issue is that justice and mercy 
sometimes conflict, so they cannot both be acted upon fully at every moment. I see no reason 
why we cannot say that one person must have the disposition of justice and the disposition of 
mercy in such a balance that sometimes she acts from justice and other times from mercy. 
Second, even if my account is not from a virtue-ethical tradition, it makes sense. Both 
justice and mercy are genuine moral goods, and we should not have a world without both. Each 
is a necessary condition for a good world. Indeed, even if justice is better than mercy, or mercy 
better than justice, we need both for the best worlds. A world only with justice or only with 
mercy is not as good of a world as a world with both justice and mercy in balance. Similarly, a 
person, not just a world, needs both, in balance, whatever that balance might be. It might be that 
the mean for the meta-virtue requires justice or mercy to take priority. That is fine, as long as 
everything is in balance. It might be that the mean requires justice and mercy to be of equal share 
but with an extra dispositional condition on actualization. That is fine, as long as everything is in 
balance. So, because we are already operating from a virtue ethical (or theoretical) standpoint, it 
seems right to propose a meta-virtue that demands balance between the two. If so, God can be 
perfectly and fully just and perfectly and fully merciful, even though they conflict, given that 
they are in balance. Without this balance, He would cease from being just and merciful. 
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III. Objection to (6) 
Let us now turn to evaluate Schellenberg’s argument. For a reminder, (6) reads as follows: If 
every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same 
type, existing prior to creation in God, then any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is 
exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure goods in God. As logic demands, to make 
(6) false, we must find a possible situation in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is 
false. There are two approaches to refute (6). First, we can refute (6) if we do not assume that 
modeling goods are better than all evil-involving-goods – that is, goods that permit or require 
evil. Second, even if we assume for this, we can refute it by analyzing what are necessary 
conditions for the best worlds. Let us begin with the first approach. 
 
A. God’s Evil-Involving-Goods Are Better Than Modeling Goods in Creatures 
Because of the infinite ladder of better (sets of) actions, if God’s maximal moral perfection is 
grounded in actions or in the outward expression of moral behavior, God will be surpassable in 
moral greatness. This cannot be. God’s maximal moral perfection is grounded in the inward 
possession of virtuous potentials to the maximal extent. Similarly, God’s maximal intellectual 
perfection is not grounded in the actualization of knowledge, but in the dispositional potentials to 
bring about knowledge. If this is true, God’s maximal greatness is not entirely made up of the 
actualization of certain properties, but in their potentiality. Though God might have some of His 
attributes entirely actualized, such as His beauty, His greatness is not entirely made up of 
actualized attributes.80 
                                                
80 It is plausible to suppose that, technically, beauty is not an actualization. Actualizations, in the way I have been 
speaking of them, arise from potentials. Yet, beauty is not from any sort of potential beauty. Nevertheless, beauty is 
an actual, in some respect, even though there is no potentiality that gives rise to it. Because of this, and to keep 
things simple, I refer to beauty here as an actualization. 
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 Note here that if some of God’s maximal perfections are potentialities, these potentialities 
are greater goods than the actualizations of the attributes. For example, the virtuous disposition 
of courageousness will be better than the actualization of acting courageously in a given 
context.81 The reason for this is because God is the greatest possible being and because His 
greatness is grounded in His potentials. Nothing can surpass His greatness, so nothing can 
surpass His potentials. Schellenberg says the same thing: given UG “the instancing in God of the 
relevant type of good is far better than any other possible instancing.”82 God’s good potentials, 
because they ground His maximal perfection, are far greater goods than any other good there is. 
Thus, God’s potentialities are greater goods than His actualizations. 
 This does not mean that the actualizations are finite in number. Some might think that if 
actualizations can infinitely increase in greatness, then they will eventually reach the point in 
which the greatness of potentialities rests. But this is not true. There are different qualities to 
goods. As Mill said, “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than 
others.”83  
Roger Crisp has a wonderful example to illustrate this point.84 Suppose that you have the 
choice between two lives, one as a composer and one as a sophisticated oyster. If you choose to 
be a composer, you will have great success, live in great honor, and experience great pleasure for 
                                                
81 It might seem paradoxical to some for God to have courage. If courage entails bravery in the midst of fear, and if 
God cannot be afraid, then God cannot be courageous. Linda Zagzebski notes this very thing. However, Zagzebski 
also notes that Aquinas claimed that God contains all virtues. Zagzebski goes further by asking how God could have 
all the virtues, including things such as courageousness, given that God cannot fear. Her answer is that the 
incarnation of God allowed Him to have courageousness (Zagzebski, p. 548). 
Even so, let us suppose that God did not become incarnate. Because potentialities do not necessarily have to be 
actualized, God could still have the potentiality of courageousness that is just never actualized. If God were to be 
afraid, then He would be courageous. He is simply never afraid. 
If these two points are unpersuasive, I ask the reader to ignore comments about courageousness and to substitute in 
comments about, say, mercifulness. The purpose of mentioning courageousness is merely to provide a wide variety 
of virtuous potentialities that require evil for actualization. 
82 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” p. 37, emphasis in the original. 
83 John Stuart Mill, “Hedonism,” from Utilitarianism (1863), in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, second edition, 
edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 259, emphasis in the original. 
84 Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Mill on Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 23-25. 
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several years. Eventually you will die at a ripe, old age, though not too old. If you choose the 
oyster, however, you will have infinitesimal pleasure for a much longer period of time. 
Eventually, if there is no difference in the quality of these good lives, the life of the oyster, if 
lived long enough, will surpass in greatness the life of the composer. This seems wrong. The 
quality of any given good matters when evaluating how good it is. By analogy, potentialities, 
which make up some of God’s perfections, are better than actualizations because they are higher 
quality goods, though there is an infinite progression of actualizations. God’s potentials are such 
great quality goods that no matter how many actualizations are present, they will never reach the 
greatness of God’s potentials, just like an oyster’s life will never reach the greatness of the life of 
the composer, even if it is lived for eternity. 
Nevertheless, there are (at least) two types of lesser goods outside of the good potentials 
that God has: the good actualizations of good potentials, and modeling goods. Because God’s 
maximal moral perfection is grounded in His virtuous potentialities, a modeling good might be 
that some people have virtuous potentialities.85 And the associated actualization of virtuous 
potentialities (in either God or creatures) is a good itself. But certain actualizations require evil to 
come into existence. For example, acting courageously requires evil that can be courageously 
faced.86 So, some actualizations are evil-involving-goods – that is, goods that permit or require 
evil. 
                                                
85 See Linda Zagzebski, p. 544, 547-549. 
It should be noted that because not all of God’s goodness is necessarily grounded in potentials, creatures might not 
be the only things that can model God’s goodness. For example, the Grand Canyon, though not a creature, might be 
able to model God’s beauty. To keep things simple, I talk primarily of creatures modeling God’s goodness by 
modeling His potentials. 
86 It might be that people can be courageous in the midst of perceived evil. However, even if the thing a person is 
afraid of is not actually evil, the (undesired) fear itself seems to be an evil, and the false perception of evil also 
seems to be an evil. 
God, of course, knows all things, so He will not perceive things falsely. If He acts courageously (or actualizes some 
potential that requires evil for actualization), because He cannot be mistaken, the evil must actually be there. 
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Other instances of actualizations require evil. For example, the actualization of 
forgiveness, from the virtuous potentiality of being forgiving, requires something to forgive. This 
entails that some sort of evil has happened to the victim, such that there is need for forgiveness. 
If there is no evil, why call it forgiveness? At least, forgiveness is done for those who have 
accidentally caused hardship for the victim. This hardship is, to some degree, evil. 
However, this sort of forgiveness, according to which victims excuse accidents, is not 
how we normally think of forgiveness. Forgiveness is normally understood as the forgiveness of 
sin. Pamela Hieronymi argues that when we forgive, we must be able to maintain that the action 
was a genuine moral wrong. When we reject such a judgment, we are not really forgiving; we are 
only excusing. By maintain that the person did not intend to do wrong, and by maintaining that 
the harm was an accident, we excuse the action and thereby release him from blame. Nothing 
wrong was done. If anyone was at fault, it was Fate. We do not think that there is anything to 
forgive when we conclude that a person has done no moral ill. Forgiveness is more substantive, 
requiring us to maintain the beliefs that the action was wrong, that the wrongdoer was a member 
of the moral community, and that we did not deserve it.87 Sin, thus, is required for forgiveness. 
Why, then, do we say that we are sorry when accidents occur? This seems to be an 
expression of condolence. For example, when a relative of a friend passes away, we might tell 
her that we are sorry to hear about her relative dying. When she accepts the “sorry,” this is not an 
instance of forgiveness, but an instance of accepting the condolence and acknowledging that we 
are sympathetic toward her sorrow. Unless we were involved in the death of her relative, we 
have no blame. There is nothing to forgive. So too, with regard to accidents in which we are 
involved, if the victims genuinely accept them as accidents, there is no forgiveness. Accepting 
                                                
87 Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
62, no. 3 (2001), pp. 529-531. 
 46 
our apologies is only accepting our condolences and acknowledging that we are sympathetic 
toward their sorrow. Forgiveness, though, requires someone to be (perceived to be) at fault. 
Furthermore, salvation, from the moral potential of being a savior, requires something to 
be saved from, which entails evil of some sort.88 Compassion, additionally, from the potentiality 
of being compassionate, requires that certain others be in unfortunate circumstances, such that 
one can be compassionate towards them. Finally, at the least, mercy, from the virtue of 
mercifulness, requires sin, such that the wrongdoer is not forced to undergo a fully just 
punishment that they deserve. In all of these instances, and possibly many others, certain 
actualizations require evil.89 
                                                
88 See Alvin Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism or ‘O Felix Culpa,’” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited 
by Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 1-25.  
89 The list could be continued. We might be able to add steadfastness, fortitude, endurance, resilience, perseverance, 
and so on. It suffices to say that some actualizations require evil. But, even if all of them do not require evil, 
substantive actualizations of these attributes require evil. (Remember that actualizations can increase in greatness ad 
infinitum.) Thus, if a reader is unmoved by certain actualizations requiring evil, I ask him or her to consider 
substantive actualizations. For example, though grace might not in itself require evil for actualization, given that it is 
undeserved favor and that no creatures deserve God’s favor, more substantive grace does require evil. See J.L. 
Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” p. 41. Another example might be God’s wise contrivance, which 
does not require evil to be actualized, but might require evil if substantively actualized. Finally, justice, which might 
be exercised with those who are good in a world, does not in itself require evil for actualization, but more 
substantive justice, in the face of evil (as a judge before sin), does require some evil. 
If the idea of substantive actualization works, this is what might bring my account from answering the LPE to the 
evidential problem of evil. As potentials enter more substantive circumstances, more substantive actualizations arise, 
resulting in better and better worlds. Thus, God might allow substantive evil so that actualizations might be 
substantive. Defending the evils of our world is a different and harder task than the one presented in this paper, so I 
leave that to the side for now. 
Additionally, if substantive actualizations do not work, we might be able to offer an alternative: Some different 
kinds of exercises of His attributes require evil, and the exercise of attributes in different ways is a great good. For 
example, though God might be able to exercise His justice plainly and simply, it is also a great good to have 
different kinds of exercises of justice. Thus, instead of God merely giving to people what they deserve in a positive 
respect (e.g., rewards), God also gives people what they deserve in a negative respect (e.g., punishments). See 
Jonathan Edwards, Miscellany #553, “End of Creation,” The "Miscellanies" (Entry Nos. 501-832) (The Works of 
Jonathan Edwards Online, Vol. 18), edited by Ava Chamberlain, accessed March 29, 2019, 
<http://edwards.yale.edu/research/misc-index>. He says, “‘Tis true that there was from eternity that act in God 
within himself and towards himself, that was the exercise of the same perfection of his nature. But it was not the 
same kind of exercise: it virtually contained it, but there was not explicitly the same exercise of his perfection. God, 
who delights in the exercise of his own perfection, delights in all the kinds of its exercise.” 
Finally, though Schellenberg’s argument itself need not make the distinction between moral and natural evils, three 
things should be noted. First, forgiveness and mercy require moral evils, whereas salvation and compassion can be 
responses to natural or moral evil. Second, substantive actualizations, such as exercising justice against moral evil, 
might entail God’s creation of natural evil for punishment, naturals evils being responses from God to sin. Third, on 
Edwards’s account, according to which exercising attributes in different ways is a great good, having compassion 
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Going on from there, let us assume that the antecedent of (6) is true: every worldly good 
that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same type, existing prior to 
creation in God. The evil-involving-goods that are the actualizations of God’s potentialities are 
greatly exceeded by their corresponding dispositions that give rise to them. These dispositions 
are pure goods, and they existed in God prior to creation. These actualizations and their 
corresponding potentials are of the same good-type.90 Further, when the antecedent says, 
“worldly good,” Schellenberg seems to mean any good that is distinct from the goodness of God 
that existed in Him prior to creation. The evil-involving-goods that are actualizations of God’s 
potentials did not exist prior to creation, given PP. So, these actualizations of God’s potentials 
can rightly be called worldly goods that permit or require evil. And, finally, every creaturely 
evil-involving-good is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same type existing in God prior to 
creation, possibly by being actualizations of potentials that model God’s potentials. 
However, from this it does not follow that any world with evil-involving-goods is thereby 
exceeded by a world with modeling goods. Why think that modeling goods in creatures are 
greater goods than the actualizations of God’s potentials? So, why think that worlds with 
modeling goods in creatures but without the evil-involving-goods of the actualizations of God’s 
potentials are able ever to exceed a world with the actualizations of God’s potentials? Just like 
God’s potentials are of such a great quality that actualizations can never exceed them in value, it 
might be that God’s actualizations are of such a great quality that they can never be exceeded by 
any creaturely good. Yet some of God’s actualizations are evil-involving-goods, such as saving 
                                                                                                                                                       
toward those who have committed (or who have been the victims of) moral evils is one kind of good, but having 
compassion toward those who are pained due to natural evil is a different kind of good, and having both is a much 
greater good than merely having one. 
90 Types are hard to classify. Presumably, though, if (G1) is correct, according to which, “For every possible good, 
among the distinguishable good-types it tokens or instances is at least one instanced in God,” evil-involving-goods 
that are the actualizations of God’s potentialities would have to be a part of some good-type that is instanced in God. 
The best thing to say, then, is that the actualizations and the potentials share the same good-type. 
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and forgiving those who have sinned. The antecedent of (6) only says that all evil-involving-
goods are exceeded by pure goods of God. It does not say that all evil-involving-goods are 
exceeded by modeling goods in creatures. So, even if the antecedent of (6) is true, why think that 
the consequent is true? 
At best, Schellenberg needs more defense of (6). But, I think that he is actually wrong. A 
world with the actualizations of God’s potentials is a better world than a world only91 with 
creatures having modeling goods of God’s potentials. This is due to the fact that God’s 
actualizations are actually better than creaturely potentials. Not all goods in God are greater 
goods than creaturely goods. For example, God’s knowledge that 2+2=4 is not as great as a 
creature loving another creature. But, with regard to God’s actualizations, they are better than 
every creaturely good. It is deeply good for God to flourish as God through the exercise of His 
nature, which is partially made up of His potentialities. It is deeply good for God’s potentials to 
be exercised so that God can be who He is. It might be good for creatures to have modeling 
goods, many of which are potentials, but God flourishing as a forgiving God in the face of sin 
seems like a much greater thing than creatures having modeling goods. If God’s virtuous 
potentialities are good, it is good for them to be exercised. 
Think of it from the perspective of non-evil-involving-actualizations. I doubt that anyone 
would seriously say that it would not be good for God to exercise, say, His knowledge. Instead of 
God’s intellectual potentials remaining forever dormant, it is a great good for Him to exercise 
                                                
91 By “only” I merely mean to indicate that evil-involving-goods are not present in the world, not necessarily that 
modeling goods are, strictly speaking, the only goods whatsoever. God might have an actualization that does not 
involve evil, such as exercising His maximal intellectual perfection, and this might be in some worlds that have (1) 
modeling goods and (2) no evil-involving-goods. I ask the reader to keep this in mind throughout this thesis. In part 
B, I will argue that it is bad (or not good) for any potential to lie dormant, which indicates that all of God’s 
potentials will be actualized in the best possible worlds. If so, to keep things simple we should posit that both worlds 
with evil-involving-goods and worlds with modeling goods have some of God’s actualizations that do not require 
evil. So, when I say “only,” I am indicating that the world with modeling goods does not have evil-involving-goods. 
That is what discussion of premise (6) is really about, so let us not get bogged down in unnecessary details. 
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them and to display His cognitive capacity. It seem like a great good for God to allow complex 
and challenging states of affairs to exist so that He can exercise His wise contrivance in solving 
issues. Though this does not necessarily entail evil, it is but a little step to say that it is good for 
some of God’s moral potentials to be exercised, some of which do require evil. Just as it is good 
for God to exercise His potential for artistic creation, so too is it a great good for God to exercise 
His divine forgiveness and salvation, both of which require sin. 
It should be noted here that this avoids the critique of the Free Will Defence because 
morally significant freedom seems to be an arbitrary good. Again, by this I mean that, though it 
might be a good, it has no real grounding in the supreme greatness of God. It is utterly 
disconnected from God’s maximal greatness. This is why Schellenberg’s argument gets around 
the Free Will Defence. As we approach the goodness of God, less morally significant freedom is 
found, if this is understood as entailing libertarian free will. And, if God’s greatness is what 
should be striven for and what makes up the best possible worlds, there seems to be no reason 
why God would want creatures to have morally significant freedom as opposed to something 
more intimately connected to His greatness, such as creaturely modeling goods. 
Similarly, this avoids the argument made to show that, on the assumption that God’s 
greatness is grounded in actualizations, God does not having potentialities whose actualizations 
require evil. If God were to have potentials whose actualizations require evil, He would have 
arbitrary goods that have no real connection at all with the highest and purest goods of God’s 
actualizations that existed in Him prior to creation. Because His maximal actualizations would be 
pure, He would have no reason to want an actualization that requires evil, as opposed to another 
that more nearly approaches God’s goodness. And, given that unactualized virtuous potentialities 
have unmet desires (to be discussed more in part B), God would not desire for Himself to have 
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virtuous potentialities whose actualizations require evil. Though they might be goods, they have 
no real connection at all with what grounds God’s maximal greatness. Creatures modeling God’s 
actualizations would be of much greater value than God having arbitrary potentials that do 
nothing but create within God desires that are never met. 
However, the actualizations of God’s attributes are as grounded in the maximal greatness 
of God as modeling goods are. If anything, the actualizations of God’s attributes are more fully 
grounded in His potentialities than modeling goods, given that they actually arise from His 
potentials. If God is to actualize any world other than a world in which He does absolutely 
nothing,92 a world in which He actualizes His attributes will be the best and most natural choice, 
and one that is not arbitrarily good, but one that is completely and utterly grounded in the 
maximal greatness of His potentials that were already present within Him before the creation of 
the world. Yet, some of God’s actualizations require some sort of evil, though not necessarily 
evils of great quality or quantity, as might be present within the actual world. So, not only is (6) 
in need of more defense, but also it is outright false. If so, Schellenberg’s argument is unsound. 
 
B. Evil-Involving-Goods Are Necessary for the Best Worlds 
Schellenberg might respond by rejecting the claim that some evil-involving-goods are better than 
modeling goods. Let us assume that he is right. Even so, does this entail that any world with 
goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure 
goods in God? I think not.  
It is possible that each evil-involving-good is exceeded in greatness by pure goods in God 
and by modeling goods, but this does not mean that evil-involving-goods are no longer necessary 
                                                
92 Because dispositions have conditions that must be met before they can be actualized, God might never be in a 
situation that causes His potentials to become actualized. In such a world, there would be no evil, and there would be 
no actualizations of God’s potentials. 
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conditions for the greatness of the best worlds.93 The parts of a world might individually be 
worse than the parts of another world, but this does not mean that some parts that are not as good 
as other parts are no longer necessary for the great good of a world on the whole. Why could it 
not be that some parts of X (not necessarily all) have greatness level 1, whereas every part of Y 
has greatness level 2, but, when put together, X is greater than Y? Even though some of X’s parts 
are not as good as all of Y’s parts, it does not thereby follow that X is not as good as Y. X could 
be better than Y. 
Let’s assume that each woman is better than each man. So, in a community, every woman 
would be better than every man. But it does not thereby follow that a community with only 
women would be better than a community with women and men. It is very plausible to say that 
men are necessary conditions for a flourishing society, though each individual woman is better 
than each individual man. Similarly, take an army as an example. It might be that generals are 
more valuable than their foot soldiers. But why think that thereby an army only with generals is 
better than an army with foot soldiers and generals? It is very plausible to say that foot soldiers 
are necessary conditions for a flourishing army. So, why think that evil-involving goods, which 
are exceeded by pure goods in God prior to creation and by modeling goods, are thereby 
unnecessary for the best worlds? It is possible that in order to have one of the best worlds, one 
must have evil-involving-goods, not just modeling goods. 
                                                
93 Because (6)’s consequent claims that all evil-involving-goods are surpassed by some world modeling the 
corresponding pure goods in God, let us ignore all worlds that are independent from both of these two world-types 
and which might exceed both in greatness (these two world-types being (1) worlds with evil-involving-goods, and 
(2) worlds modeling the corresponding pure goods in God). Including such worlds simply complicates things, and is 
unnecessary to argue for or against (6), given that (6)’s consequent claims that worlds with evil-involving-goods can 
be surpassed by worlds modeling the pure goods in God. So, by “best worlds,” I mean to indicate that evil-
involving-goods are necessary for the worlds that are the best among the possible worlds within the two possible 
world-types. Further, note that “best worlds” is also meant to indicate here that some worlds with evil-involving-
goods are better than all worlds with modeling goods. This does not mean that, within the worlds that have evil-
involving-goods and are not surpassed by worlds with modeling goods, there is a best. It might be that these worlds 
continually increase in greatness, such that there is no best among these worlds. But among these worlds, they are all 
included in the category of the “best worlds,” given that they surpass all worlds with modeling goods. 
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However, someone might respond by pointing out that the analogy is weak. Though the 
two sexes need each other for reproduction, and though a general needs foot soldiers to carry out 
his orders, there is a metaphysically possible sex that reproduces asexually and there is a 
metaphysically possible general who is fully capable of carrying out his own orders. We are not 
talking about what is practically necessary, such as men and women needing one another for 
reproduction. No, what is needed to prove the consequent false (“any world with goods 
permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure goods in 
God”) is a claim that there is some metaphysically possible world with goods permitting or 
requiring evil that is not exceeded by a world only modeling the corresponding pure goods in 
God. This would mean that it is metaphysically necessary for the best worlds to have evil-
involving-goods, such that no world only with modeling goods would ever be able to exceed 
these worlds. But, continues the objector, why think that evil-involving-goods are metaphysically 
necessary for the best worlds?  
The reason for thinking this is that worlds in which potentialities are present but in which 
there is no actualization of these potentialities are worlds that are always surpassed by worlds 
with actualizations. This is not necessarily to say that worlds only with potentials are bad worlds, 
but it is to say that all worlds only with potentials are surpassed by worlds with actuals and 
potentials.94 We can see this when we consider three points. First, without the actualization of all 
of a being’s potentialities, that being is unable to flourish (fully) as the being it is. Second, when 
potentialities lie dormant, they are unused, but it is better for them to be exercised. Similarly, in a 
world without any opportunity for the actualization of a potential, potentials become useless. 
Third, beings who have potentialities or know of potentialities in others tend to long for the 
                                                
94 I do think that a world only with potentials is a bad world, but I do not need that for this paper. All I need is to 
demonstrate that worlds are better with actualizations. 
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exercise of these potentialities, such that, when one potentiality is unable to be exercised, 
longings are unable to be satisfied. 
First, good potentialities, both in God and in creatures, lying dormant do not make for a 
world that is excellent because the actualization of potentials is necessary for personal 
flourishing. This is apparently what Aristotle understood.95 Naturally, other philosophers have 
taken similar views. For example, Richard Taylor argues that the flourishing life is one in which 
we exercise our function, which, for Taylor, was creativity. He says the following: “If we think 
of happiness as fulfillment, then it must consist of the fulfillment of ourselves as human beings, 
which means the exercise of our creative powers. For we are, among the creatures of the earth, 
the only ones possessed of such power.”96 Here, Taylor is using “happiness” and “fulfillment” in 
the same way that Aristotle used eudaimonia,97 which is also regularly translated as 
“flourishing.”98 We must function properly.99 Without the exercise of our potentials, we are not 
                                                
95 See Thomas Hurka, “Virtuous Act, Virtuous Dispositions,” Analysis 66, no. 1 (2006), p. 72. He claims that 
Aristotle “held that the prime contributor to flourishing is the active exercise of virtue, found in occurrent virtuous 
acts, desires, and feelings”. He cites, in part, the following passage: 
First, our account agrees with those who say happiness [or flourishing] is virtue [in general] or 
some [particular] virtue; for activity in accord with virtue is proper to virtue. Presumably, though, 
it matters quite a bit whether we suppose that the best good consists in possessing or in using – 
that is to say, in a state or in an activity [that actualizes the state]. For someone may be in a state 
that achieves no good – if, for instance, he is asleep or inactive in some other way – but this 
cannot be true of the activity; for it will necessarily act and act well. And just as Olympic prizes 
are not for the finest and strongest, but for the contestants – since it is only these who win – the 
same is true in life; among the fine and good people, only those who act correctly win the prize 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 8, 1098b30-1099a7).  
This can be found in: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, second edition, translated by Terence Irwin 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000); in Classics of Moral and Political Theory, fifth edition, 
edited by Michael Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), p. 261. The second, third, 
and fourth sets of brackets are found in the text. Of course, my claim is that the best goods are potentials. I 
am simply claiming that flourishing through the actualization of potentials is an additional good that is 
necessary for the best worlds. The rest of this paragraph explains why I add the first set of brackets.  
96 Richard Taylor, “Virtue Ethics,” in Happiness: Classical and Contemporary Readings in Philosophy, edited by 
Steven Cahn and Christine Vitrano (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 232.  
97 Ibid., p. 223. 
98 Russ Shafer-Landau, “Introduction to Part XI,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 611. 
99 Richard Taylor, p. 231. 
 54 
functioning as we should. This applies both to God and to creatures. When either God or 
creatures do not exercise their potentials, they are not functioning properly. 
Without actualizations, you are missing a massive component of what makes a being’s 
life great. Consider that potentialities make up the nature of a person. When we say, for example, 
that a person is morally good, we are indicating that she has a morally good character from 
which morally good actions flow. She naturally acts in morally good ways. This seems to 
indicate that her nature is composed of certain virtuous potentialities that naturally give rise to 
virtuous actions. But if she does not have the ability to actualize a potential of hers, and if her 
potentials make up her nature, she would not be able, as it were, to actualize her nature. She 
would be unable to exercise her very being. 
Even if she were to be able to exercise some of her potentials, if some of them are left 
unactualized, she is not completely flourishing as ought to be the case. Yet, some of these 
attributes, such as courageousness and forgivingness, require evil for them to be actualized. So, 
for people who have the potentiality of forgiveness, if they are in a world without evil, they will 
never be able to flourish as forgiving people because they will never have the ability to act on 
their very nature. 
Before creation, each attribute within God would have been perfect, such that no worldly 
good could have surpassed any good in God. Truly, God would have satisfied UG, PP, and OI. 
Because God would have been the only being in that world, that world would have been perfect. 
But this does not mean that He was flourishing without the actualization of His potentials. His 
actualizations might not be as good as His virtues or as good as modeling goods within creatures, 
but this does not mean that His actualizations were not things that were missing from His life on 
the whole. It would have been better for God Himself, for Him to actualize His dispositional 
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traits. It is only a natural step to say that without the actualization of His potentials, something 
would have been missing from the world on the whole, not just His life, to make it the case that, 
that world is not as good as a world with the actualizations of His potentials. Worlds without 
actualizations are not as good of worlds as worlds with actualizations. 
Second, there is something about having wasted talents that is not excellent. 
When a potential is unused, it is not a good thing. When intelligent people are offered the 
opportunity to go to college or to enter into an activity that exercises their intelligence but 
choose to sit at home and do nothing, we find this bad at least partially because their 
gifted intelligence is not being used as it could be. Those who are not intelligent might 
think to themselves, If only I were smart and had the opportunity to go to college! The 
reason we find slothfulness bad might partially be because it prevents people from being 
productive members of society, but it also is thought of as bad because people are 
wasting their lives. 
An even stronger claim is that potentials are useless without the possibility that 
they are actualized. A world in which there is no need or use for mercy is a world in 
which mercifulness is useless, unneeded, and unnecessary. So, were God or creatures to 
have mercifulness as a potential, their potentials would be useless, unneeded, and 
unnecessary. That does not seem like a best world. This is one reason why the 
overdetermination of potentials is not a good thing and is quite possibly a bad thing. 
Uselessness should be avoided.  
 Third, many people long and yearn for the actualization of their own potentials 
and the potentials of others. For example, a gracious and rich man might seek out 
opportunities to give to others. Were he to fail to find anyone who needed help, he might 
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return home happy, knowing that others were not in need of his help, but there is a 
likelihood that he would feel some discomfort, knowing that he himself was unable to be 
of any help. Similarly, we can imagine volunteers who help at a soup kitchen. If no one 
comes in, they might, just like with the rich man, be happy that no one was in need of 
their food, but they might think to themselves that they missed out on the good of serving 
others. Or, for another example, we can imagine a courageous and brave man wanting to 
fight for what is right. He might long for the day in which he is able to serve his country 
with honor and to do great deeds on the battlefield. Were there no battles into which he 
could enter, though he might be happy to know that he did not have to fight, due to the 
belief that the end for which he fought had already been won; he might still long for the 
day in which he is able to act upon his virtues. We long, not merely to have moral virtues, 
but also to act upon them. Virtues without expression regularly cause turmoil within the 
virtuous. We want to flourish as the beings that we are by acting on our virtues. So, a 
world without actualizations is not as good as a world with actualizations.  
Indeed, the reason why (maximal) virtuous potentialities are dispositions is 
because they contain motivational force that is so powerful that virtue-holders naturally 
act when relevant situations arise. They are so inclined toward a particular action that 
they cannot help but to act accordingly.100 Virtuous potentials are not mysterious 
properties of people that force them to act against their will. Virtues have desires within 
them that drive people to act. Thus, virtuous potentials, which have dispositions within 
them, are really only very strong desires that are ever present, such that one will act 
                                                
100 See Linda Zagzebski, pp. 539 and 545. 
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accordingly whenever one can.101 The same motivational force that drives us to act 
whenever any relevant situation arises is the same force that causes us to yearn for 
actualization. But if this is the case, anyone with virtuous potentialities necessarily has 
desires, which, if his potentials remain unactualized, go unmet.  
 In my own personal life, I can only guess at how many times I have fantasized 
about being virtuous in the face of evil. I constantly imagine myself in various scenarios, 
hoping that I will be able to rise to the level of a moral giant. I imagine, for example, 
someone trying to rob or to mug me. I revel in the thought of being able to remain 
steadfast, wise, and gracious in such a situation. I imagine, for another example, a future 
child of mine crying out in fear of the dark. I revel in the thought of being able lovingly 
to comfort her heart. And, in many ways, I yearn for such things to take place, though I 
do not desire the actual evil states of affairs in themselves. If I were never to have the 
chance whatsoever to exercise my virtuous dispositions – how horrible a life that would 
be! The thought of the actualization of these potentialities produce in us a certain 
idealization about the good life, and we cannot help but yearn for these actualizations, 
including those actualizations that require evil. 
One reason we take delight in stories is due to our own potentials being actualized 
during the telling of the story. For example, a Sherlock Holmes novel might thrill us as 
we exercise our reason, trying to solve the case before the great detective does. Or, a 
Shakespearean tragedy might thrill us as we delight in the compassion we are able to feel 
towards those who endure unfortunate life events. Indeed, not only do we delight in the 
compassion we are able to express during tragedies, but we also seek out such 
                                                
101 See David Hume, p. 265-268 (2.3.3). The Humean theory of motivation roughly states that all motives have some 
sort of desire grounding or constituting them. 
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compassion! We want to experience the actualization of our compassionate potentials, so 
we watch tragic movies. 
Another reason why we love stories is due to the actualization of other people 
acting on their potentials. When we know of the potentials of another person, we want to 
experience them actualizing their potentials. It is not excellent merely for a bunch of 
people to sit around being virtuous and wise. No, we long for the actualizations of their 
potentialities and want to experience them. When a character in a story is said to be wise, 
we do not want merely to know this; we want to see them express it. Without 
actualization, the longings of both God and creatures are left unsatisfied. This makes for a 
world that is not as good as a world with the evil-involving-goods of actualizations. 
We can see these themes in one of Jonathan Edwards’s major works, The End for Which 
God Created the World. He says the following concerning what God actually did, not merely 
what God logically could do, concerning the reason for which He created our world: 
It seems a thing in itself proper and desirable that the glorious attributes of God, 
which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the 
production of such effects as might manifest his infinite power, wisdom, 
righteousness, goodness, &c. If the world had not been created, these attributes 
never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in 
him to produce great effects, must for ever have been dormant and useless as to 
any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any 
wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding, or disposal of things; for there would 
have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of 
God’s justice, goodness, and truth.102 
 
Edwards understood that there is a certain kind of goodness associated with the exercise 
of God’s attributes in creation, and we want to avoid them being useless. Because of this, 
it is desirable for God’s potentials to be actualized.  
                                                
102 Jonathan Edwards, The End for Which God Created the World, in John Piper, God’s Passion for His Glory 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1998), p. 147, emphases in the original. 
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Going a bit beyond what Edwards said, were God simply to refuse to exercise His 
attributes, He would remain perfect, but the world on the whole would not be one of the 
best worlds. God created (partially) in order to actualize His attributes, some of which, 
such as forgiveness and salvation, could not be exercised without evil. The best worlds 
include God actualizing His magnificent attributes, some of which require evil. His 
potentials would otherwise be useless. 
 It should be noted here that I am answering the LPE, not the evidential problem of evil 
(EPE). It might be that certain evils (found in the actual world) that are discussed in the EPE are 
not necessary conditions for the best worlds – indeed, they might be sufficient conditions for the 
worst worlds – but this does not mean that there are not some evils, maybe evils of incredibly 
small quantity or quality, that are necessary for the best worlds so that God or creatures might 
actualize their potentials. For example, though a deer suffering in extreme agony for days on end 
after a wildfire103 might not be necessary for the best worlds, a small spider bite, let us say, 
which causes slight discomfort, might be necessary in a world to allow the potentiality of God’s 
healing or the potentiality of a creature’s bravery to be actualized. A small sin might be 
necessary in the best worlds so that merciful creatures might display mercy and forgiveness. All I 
need is that the best worlds have some sort of evil in them, and the LPE has been solved. And I 
think some sort of evil is necessary for the actualization of these potentialities and that the 
actualization of these potentialities is what makes for the best worlds. The potentialities 
otherwise lie dormant, which makes the world insufficient for being amongst the best worlds. 
Finally, worlds that only model some of God’s pure goods can always be surpassed by 
worlds that model all of His pure goods. Because some of His pure goods are potentialities, any 
                                                
103 William Rowe, “The Inductive Argument from Evil Against the Existence of God,” in Philosophy of Religion: 
An Anthology, sixth edition, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 
2012), p. 309. 
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world that models all of God’s pure goods, models all of God’s pure potentialities. But all worlds 
with both God and creatures having potentials without actualization, can be surpassed by worlds 
with both God and creatures having potentials with actualization. Yet some of the actualizations 
of these potentials, such as forgiveness and salvation, require evil, so these worlds with the 
actualization of potentials will require evil. So, there is at least one world with evil-involving-
goods that cannot be surpassed by a world only with modeling goods. The world in which God 
has potentials, in which creatures model all of God’s perfections, some of which are potentials, 
and in which these potentials are actualized, some of which require evil – this world surpasses 
(given the enumerated points above) the worlds only with modeling goods, in which God has 
potentials and in which creatures model all of God’s pure goods, some of which are potentials, 
but neither God nor creatures actualize all their potentials. Whenever a world has potentials that 
lie dormant, there is a corresponding world that has the actualization of these potentials. All-else-
being-equal, that world with actualizations will be better than the world without them. (6) is 
false. In fact, the consequent of (6) should read: any world modeling the corresponding pure 
goods in God is exceeded by a world with goods permitting or requiring evil.104 
 
C. Objections and Replies 
An objector might respond. Goods that model God’s potentials need not be potentials 
themselves. Schellenberg notes that he understands modeling goods broadly.105 Maybe when a 
creature models a potentiality of God, it has an actualization of a potentiality, not a potentiality 
                                                
104 Potentials do not require actualization to be good. They are good on their own. Indeed, they ground the 
fundamental goodness of God. But, (1) when conditions have been met to satisfy the requirements for actualization, 
they naturally give rise to actualization; and (2) it is good for them to be actualized. For example, God might have 
the virtuous potentiality of mercifulness. In a world without evil, His potential would be unactualized and would 
produce within God a natural desire to be fulfilled. Yet, the good potentiality, even though unactualized, would still 
be part of the grounds for God’s maximal moral perfection. When suitable circumstances arise that allow for God to 
be merciful, God naturally acts mercifully, and this is a good thing. 
105 J.L. Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” p. 38. 
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itself. In other words, modeling goods might mirror God’s potentialities by being manifested, not 
as potentialities, but as actualities.  
However, if that is so, many modeling goods simply collapse into evil-involving-goods, 
in which case evil will be present in the world. To put it differently, for God’s potentiality of 
forgiveness, creature C might model this potentiality by having the actualization of forgiving 
another being, but this requires evil of some sort. If C does not model by actualization, he has the 
potentiality, and the argument above runs the same. And, even if this is not the case, God still has 
potentialities. This alone makes it good for Him to actualize His potentialities, some of which 
require evil. 
A second, and more substantive, objection is this. Talk of God not flourishing before the 
actualization of His attributes makes creation and evil necessary for God’s flourishing. If God’s 
flourishing requires all of God’s actualizations (so that potentials do not lie dormant), and if 
some of God’s actualizations require creatures and evil (as in God’s forgiveness), then God’s 
flourishing requires creatures and evil. This seems to make God’s happiness and flourishing 
dependent upon things that they should not be dependent upon, namely creatures and evil. 
Three responses can be made to God requiring creation and evil to flourish. First, there 
might be degrees of flourishing. Because of God’s greatness, He might flourish simply by being. 
He does not need to do anything. He can simply be. But, there is a greater kind of flourishing, in 
which God is able to live a better life, when He actualizes His attributes. Thus, creation and evil 
are not necessary for God to flourish, plainly and simply, but they are necessary for God to 
flourish to even better extents.106 
Second, it is not even clear that God requiring creation and evil for His flourishing is a 
bad thing. There are two reasons for this. First, creation and evil being logical necessities does 
                                                
106 See footnote 89. 
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not entail that God’s flourishing is grounded in creation or evil. Grounding is different than 
logical necessity. For example, for x to love y, it is logically necessary for both x and y to exist. 
But it is hardly appropriate to say that either x’s existence or y’s existence grounds x’s love. X 
loves y for reasons (both internally and externally) quite independent from x existing or y 
existing. Their existences simply happen to be logical requirements for x’s love of y. I see no 
problem, then, with saying that God’s love for me requires creation, not because my existence 
grounds God’s love, but because I have to exist for Him to love me. 
Similarly, God’s flourishing having a necessary condition of creation and evil does not 
entail that God’s flourishing is grounded in creation and evil. God’s flourishing is grounded in 
God’s actualizations, which are grounded in His potentials. His actualizations simply have 
required conditions surrounding them, and these conditions happen to be creation and evil. God 
does not receive anything from the creation, nor from evil; there is no “metaphysical juice,” as it 
were, that is transferred from the creation or from evil to the actualization. Indeed, the existence 
of all things is still dependent upon God. Creation and evil simply are logically required means 
through which certain potentials must be actualized. This is why actualizations are good, not 
evil. They get their “metaphysical juice,” as it were, from potentials that are also good. 
We can see this point more clearly when we consider the difference between by and 
through. Suppose that there is a tunnel that many commuters take to work every morning. It 
would be correct to say that the commuters commuted by means of their cars, but through means 
of the tunnel; and to mean different things by these words. Through indicates a passageway, but 
by indicates what propels the cars through the passageway. God’s actualizations are not made by 
creation or evil. They do not propel Him. But God’s actualizations are made through them, as 
necessary passageways through which potentials may be actualized. So too, God’s actualizations 
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are formed by His potentials, not through His potentials. His potentials are what drive Him to 
actualization. So, God’s actualizations are formed by His potentials, but through creation and 
evil. Thus, there seems to be no real issue with saying that creation and evil are necessary 
conditions for God’s flourishing. 
The second reason why it should not be problematic to say that God and evil are required 
for God’s flourishing is that flourishing is different from God’s greatness, God’s happiness, and 
God’s blessing. A being can be great, but not flourish, if they have a certain amount of value, but 
never act qua who they are. Similarly, a being can flourish without being great. For example, a 
dog, which does not have substantive value, can flourish as a dog as it acts qua dog. Because of 
this disconnection between greatness and flourishing, I see no reason to suppose that God would 
increase in value when flourishing. Flourishing and greatness are independent from one another. 
God is not made more valuable when flourishing. He simply lives a better life.107 
Further, a human H might be incredibly happy and live a blessed life. But, if we suppose 
that humans are fundamentally rational beings, and if we suppose that H is not very intelligent 
and does not exercise his limited intelligence very often, H might not flourish qua H (or qua a 
human), even though H might still live a wonderfully great life, filled with honor, pleasure, 
riches, and delight. All of these things (namely, greatness, happiness, and blessing) are distinct 
from flourishing; yet it is still a good thing for h, in addition to H’s already great life, to flourish 
qua H. 
The idea is this. Flourishing is not merely having a good life. Flourishing might require 
having a good life (as it might require many things), but it also requires expressing or acting 
                                                
107 Something that might help to clarify this point is that God’s own greatness is grounded in His potentials. The 
greatness of His life is grounded (at least partially) in His actualizations. God Himself is maximally valuable, great, 
and perfect; but this does not entail that His life is maximally valuable, great, or perfect. His life can always increase 
in value, just like actualizations can always increase in value, but His metaphysical value is constant and 
unsurpassable.  
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upon who we are fundamentally. Hitler might fundamentally be evil. For Hitler to flourish qua 
Hitler, he would need to act upon who he fundamentally is. This flourishing would, of course, be 
evil, due to it arising from an evil nature, but God has a fundamental nature that is good, from 
which good flourishings arise.108 Though God might have been happy, blessed, and of great 
value before either creation or evil came about, He was not flourishing qua God until creation 
and evil arose. God, who is fundamentally a merciful being, might have lived a good and 
wonderful life before creation and evil, but He was not flourish as a merciful God until there was 
something to be merciful towards. I see no issue with this.109 
Third,110 even if we must embrace that God does not need creation or evil for flourishing, 
at the least God’s potentials (and creaturely potentials) form within Him (and them) a desire for 
actualization.111 Because of this, even if God flourishes before actualizing His potentials, the 
world is still made better when God fulfills His longings for actualization (and when creatures 
fulfill their longings for actualization).112 
Finally, I conclude this section and introduce the next section with the following 
objection. What if all worlds can be surpassed? I claimed that any world modeling the 
corresponding pure goods in God is exceeded by a world with goods permitting or requiring evil. 
This is not inconsistent with the consequent of (6). It is possible that any world with goods 
permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a (or some, not necessarily every) world modeling the 
                                                
108 It should be noted here that there is at least one possible world in which creatures only have good fundamental 
natures, possibly by modeling God’s goodness. 
109 Remember, the argument I am presenting is that flourishing is necessary for the best worlds. Even if happiness, 
blessedness, and greatness are better goods than flourishing, flourishing still adds a lot of good to the world, such 
that, without it, we can always imagine a better world, namely one in which the creatures within it are flourishing. 
110 I am here returning to the list of three responses to the objection that God needs creation and evil to flourish. 
111 If one worries that desires entail a need or a lack, one might be able to say that God does not desire but prefers. 
Desires might indicate a need, whereas preferences might not. 
112 If a reader is so inclined to reject my responses to the objection that God’s flourishing requires creation and evil, I 
ask that the reader keep this paragraph in mind throughout the rest of this paper. I will continue to speak of 
flourishing as being a great good that requires actualization. However, one may substitute “flourishing” for 
“fulfilling good desires for actualization,” which is also a great good that requires actualization. Indeed, I take the 
fulfillment of strong desires to be necessary for flourishing, as will be discussed in Section IV, part C. 
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corresponding pure goods in God; and it is possible that any world modeling the corresponding 
pure goods in God is exceeded by a (or some, not necessarily every) world with goods permitting 
or requiring evil. World-types (e.g., worlds with evil-involving-goods, and worlds only modeling 
the corresponding pure goods in God) might eternally go back-and-forth between exceeding and 
being exceeded as they progress into infinite greatness ad infinitum. Indeed, both pure modeling 
goods and the actualization of potentials are intimately grounded in God’s fundamental maximal 
greatness, and because there are infinite “spots” of goodness, given that God can continually add 
more to a world, presumably both world-types exceed and are exceeded by one another as more 
“spots of goodness” are filled by goods intimately grounded in God’s goodness. 
Though I think it is quite intuitive, given what has been said, to think that the best worlds 
are those with God’s actualizations, let us give as much room as possible. Let us assume that 
world-types continually surpass one another. I move now to my objection to premise (9). 
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IV. Objection to (9) 
Even though I take the above argument to be fairly convincing, some still might not be 
convinced by it. Yet, even if God’s actualization of potentials does not create a best world that 
cannot be surpassed by worlds only with modeling goods, at the least it creates a state of affairs 
that provides God with a morally sufficient reason to create it. 
Part A of section IV briefly enumerates some assumptions concerning duties and 
obligations grounded in Divine Command Theory. Part B defends the claim that God has a 
morally sufficient reason for creating a world with evil-involving-goods by virtue of the fact that 
the actualization of God’s potentialities is a very good thing, though it might not be amongst the 
best things. After this, I will argue in part C that love provides God with another morally 
sufficient reason for creating a world with evil-involving-goods. In part D, I address some 
potential concerns. All of this takes aim at premise (9), which claims that if any world with 
goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure 
goods in God (the consequent of (6) is true), and if God can ensure the existence of greater 
worlds, then God has no good reason to create a world with evil-involving-goods rather than a 
world that only models God’s goodness. 
Given the last objection provided in part III, section C, let us assume that the first 
conjunct of the antecedent is true. Let us also assume that God is all-powerful in such a way that 
He can ensure the existence of both worlds with evil-involving-goods and worlds only with 
modeling goods. This makes the antecedent’s second conjunct also true. But is the consequent 




A. Divine Command Theory Assumptions 
The rest of this paper assumes that God has no duties.113 I would like to flush this out. I do not 
have space in this thesis to defend Divine Command Theory, so I will assume for it, as many 
theists are already inclined to do,114 and list some facts that make it plausible and direct our 
attention to the topic of this paper. 
 First, Divine Command Theory has famously been subject to the Euthyphro Dilemma. 
Either something is moral because God commands it, in which case morality is arbitrary and 
God’s goodness has little foundation; or God commands something because it is moral, in which 
case God is not the ground or basis for all things. Both horns of the dilemma are undesirable to 
many theists, and so we must modify our account. Because of this, we should say that goodness 
is grounded in the nature of God. As has been argued above, God has all manner of virtues. 
These can plausibly be the ground for morality. God’s moral nature in having these virtues is 
what we are striving to mirror when we strive to be morally good. This avoids both horns of the 
dilemma. Morality is not arbitrary, God’s goodness has a strong foundation, and God is the 
ground for morality.115 
 Furthermore, goodness and obligation (or duty) are different from one another. In a world 
in which there are many actions that are morally good, some might be morally obligatory, though 
some might not be. It might be a morally good thing to give one’s life in defense of another, but 
this is not obligatory. Why must a person give his life in defense of another? When we consider 
the idea of obligation, we think of something that has to be done. There is no wiggle room. If one 
                                                
113 If God’s only duties are for Him to be virtuous, then the subsequent arguments that follow will still work. I am 
talking about God not having extra duties in addition to any duties concerning the possession of the virtues. 
114 See, for instance, Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” The Journal of Religious 
Ethics 7, no. 1 (1979), pp. 66-79. 
115 Mark Linville, “On Goodness: Human and Divine,” American Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1990), pp. 143-
152. See also William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian Theism and the 
Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael Beaty (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 267-
272. 
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has an obligation to φ, then one must φ.116 But what of the good actions that are non-obligatory? 
Sometimes actions are good but not obligatory because they go beyond our duties. 
Supererogatory acts are things worthy of pursuit, but no one is required to pursue them. 
 Independent from supererogation, another way actions can be good, but not obligatory, is 
by there being an obligation to do one of several actions, but not being obligated to do any 
particular one of them. For example, I might have an obligation to love my neighbor. Indeed, I 
might have an obligation to love all of my neighbors. But when am I obliged to help one as 
opposed to another? If I have two neighbors and limited resources, I might only be able to help 
one of them. In this situation, it would be good to help both, but I might only be obligated to help 
one. Maybe I have a passion for helping starving children across the world, and so I strive to 
serve them, though by doing so, I ignore the needs of those in my home country. This seems 
morally justifiable as long as I am loving them all. Helping those in my home country might be 
good, but it is not obligatory. 
This is where God’s commands come into the story; hence, “Divine Command Theory.” 
God commands certain things of certain people, and this takes an action that is morally good and 
makes it morally obligatory.117 The reason for this is because God has a rightful authority to 
command certain things. And He might command something because He wants to ensure that 
certain actions are done or that certain people are cared for. Either way, God’s commands bring 
us (and are the only things that bring us) from what is morally good to what is morally 
                                                
116 William Alston, p. 258. 
117 God’s commands similarly might make it obligatory to have a virtue. Indeed, how we distinguish virtues from 
other character traits within God might be by His commands that He gives to us.  
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obligatory.118 Why, for example, we have an obligation to help others is because God has 
commanded us to help.119 
 But if God’s commands bring an action from being merely morally good to what is 
morally obligatory, then presumably God need not command certain things of Himself. God 
need not command many things. Indeed, it is possible that God never commands anything. 
 This argument against God having obligations is distinct from other forms. William 
Alston, taking from Immanuel Kant, for example, argues that God has no duties because duties 
are only practical guidelines to keep us on track in abiding by what is good. But, because God 
never goes astray, God does not have moral obligations.120 Thomas Morris argues that God has 
no moral obligations because He is necessarily good, which impedes Him from having morally 
significant freedom, a necessary condition for having moral duties.121 Both of these authors think 
that God acts according to what would have been moral duties for God, had He not been 
essentially good. But my account of God not having moral obligations does not require God to 
act according to what would have been obligatory for Him were He not to have been essentially 
good. My account says that God need not ever obligate Himself whatsoever. I believe that God 
can obligate Himself or take upon Himself a duty, maybe in the making of a covenant, but God 
does not have to obligate Himself or take upon Himself any duty of any kind. Indeed, He could 
command others to φ, but not command Himself to φ, just like a king might command his 
servants to do certain chores, though he himself does no such thing. 
                                                
118 See Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction, second edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2013), pp. 30-33. 
119 I am thinking of commands broadly. “Commands” might be strictly understood, in which God directly demands 
that we φ. Though this might happen some of the time, I allow for the possibility of God assigning rights to people, 
which indirectly demand of us that we abide by what God has willed. Either way, the main idea is that God 
considers what is morally good and then acts in some respect to bring it from a moral good to a moral obligation. 
120 William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” pp. 256-265. 
121 Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God, pp. 51-64. 
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 Therefore, because we are talking about the LPE, let us suppose from now on that God 
has no moral obligations. Note here that this does not automatically solve the LPE. God still is 
good, and we must determine whether His nature of virtuous goodness would require Him to 
prevent evil. All this section does is note that we need not worry about obligations. 
 
B. Actualization as a Morally Sufficient Reason for Evil-Involving-Goods 
Now that we have established that it is possible that God has no obligations, let us see whether 
God has any good reason for choosing a world with evil-involving-goods. Because there are no 
best worlds, and because God has no obligations to prevent evil, I see no reason why God would 
not be perfectly justified in creating a world that actualizes His or His creature’s attributes, even 
though it might not be amongst the best worlds. 
In section III I argued that it is a great good for God and creatures to actualize their 
potentialities. But I finished that section with an objection concerning the eternal progression of 
better worlds: “World-types (e.g., worlds with evil-involving-goods, and worlds only modeling 
the corresponding pure goods in God) might eternally go back-and-forth between exceeding and 
being exceeded as they progress into infinite greatness ad infinitum.” If so, there are no best 
worlds, and there is no best world-type. But, at least, there are some worlds with evil-involving-
goods that are, on the whole, very good worlds due to the actualization of potentials. 
If God does anything other than simply remain alone and do nothing,122 He will have to 
choose some sort of world to actualize. But what world is God justified in actualizing? If God 
has no obligations, in which case, God is not obligated to choose a world without evil; if there 
are no best worlds and if there is no best world-type, in which case, no matter what God chooses, 
                                                
122 There is at least one possible world in which God chooses not to remain alone and to do nothing. 
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His chosen world will be able to be surpassed in greatness; and if God chooses a very good 
world; God will be perfectly justified in actualizing that world. 
No doubt, an omnipotent, virtuous agent might not prevent an evil if the evil allows a 
greater good that is intimately grounded in God’s fundamental goodness to arise, or if the evil 
prevents a greater evil. And is not the actualization of God’s potentials a great good that 
surpasses, say, a small sin that allows God to exercise His disposition toward forgiveness? Is not 
the actualization of creaturely potentials a great good that surpasses, say, the evil of a small bite 
by a small spider that causes slight discomfort in such a way that creatures are able to act bravely 
in the face of it? Actualizing potentials (whether the potentials are the potentials of God or the 
potentials of creatures modeling God’s potentials) is a great good that is intimately grounded in 
God’s pre-creation perfection and that provides God with a very good reason for allowing evil. 
If so, the consequent of (9) will be false, even though the antecedent will be true, on our 
assumptions that God is omnipotent and that my previous argument for the falsity of the 
consequent of (6) is wrong. This makes (9) false. Thus, if my objection against (6) works, 
Schellenberg’s argument fails. If my objection against (6) does not work, Schellenberg’s 
argument fails at premise (9). 
 
C. Love as a Morally Sufficient Reason for Evil-Involving-Goods 
I think it is very clear that God has good reason to allow evil. It allows Him to actualize His 
potentialities, and it allows others to actualize their potentialities. This seems like a great good to 
me. However, some still might worry that these actualizations are not great enough goods in and 
of themselves to warrant evil. I now turn to answer how God’s perfectly virtuous nature might 
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still allow for the existence of evil, even though the actualizations of potentialities are not in 
themselves morally sufficient for the allowance of evil. 
Universal love, the chief virtue,123 which is sometimes directed at one’s own flourishing, 
and other times at the flourishing of others, can sometimes produce states of affairs that have evil 
within them.124 Given the complexity of the actual world, even virtuous actions that are aimed at 
the good of others sometimes lead to evil. For example, we can imagine virtuous aid workers 
sending provisions to starving children in foreign countries. But we can also imagine that their 
actions of sending aid are significant contributions to climate change because they send planes 
back and forth from remote villages to where the provisions are being stored. Even if they know 
that their actions will lead to climate change and great evil, they might be so concerned for the 
lives of those in these foreign countries that they continue in their efforts. But this seems 
virtuously loving nevertheless. All of the actions of loving people are causal components in a 
causal chain that leads to good and evil down the (infinite) road of the future. Thus, acting 
lovingly sometimes leads to good and sometimes to evil states of affairs in the actual world. 
Nevertheless, out of an abundant love for the creatures of a world, God might simply 
allow evil so that they might flourish. In section III, I argued that it was a great good for 
creatures to flourish as themselves. Though this flourishing itself through the actualization of 
potentials might not be a necessary condition for the best worlds, and though this might not itself 
be a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil, God’s love, which aims at allowing 
                                                
123 See footnote 79. 
124 One might wonder whether God could love Himself and others without aiming for His and their flourishing. 
However, I have no idea how love could aim at anything less than the loved object’s flourishing. It seems almost 
analytically true that if x loves y, then x is disposed to pursue the flourishing of y. Love is more robust than merely 
maintaining a person’s life. Love actively pursues the loved object’s best life. 
Additionally, if it is still thought that a being can flourish without actualization, an easy modification can be made to 
the argument in this section. Instead of love aiming at the flourishing of individuals, we could say that love aims at 
the fulfillment of the desires of individuals, to some degree at least, given that love does not merely maintain a loved 
being’s life. Because potentials naturally produce the desire for actualization, this modification should be no 
problem. 
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creatures to flourish in accordance with their potentialities that model God’s goodness, is a 
morally sufficient reason to allow evil. 
This is a subtle point. The flourishing of creatures might not itself be a morally sufficient 
reason for evil (though I think it is, as was argued in section IV, part B), but God’s love is. 
Acting from the supreme virtue of universal love justifies the action of allowing evil.125 There is 
a possible world in which, in abundant affection for His creatures, knowing that their potentials 
model His great goods, He allows a small amount of evil so that they can actualize their 
potentials and flourish as themselves. I see no issue with this. Remember, we are arguing against 
the LPE, not the EPE. Allowing just a small amount of evil for the flourishing of His creatures 
through the actualization of their potentials seems like a good. 
However, universal love is not purely directed at others. If love is universal, it is directed 
at all things that can be loved. God can be loved. So, universal love is directed at God as well. 
Not only is God loving toward His creatures by allowing some evil in the world, but He is also 
loving of Himself by allowing some evil into the world. The rest of part C will defend this claim. 
Susan Wolf has expressed sentiments regarding the good of pursuing one’s own interests. 
Indeed, she argues that being a moral saint is not a good thing. She defines a moral saint as one 
whose “life [is] dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of others and of society as 
a whole.”126 The moral saint “pays little or no attention to his own happiness in light of the 
overriding importance he gives to the wider concerns of morality.”127 Wolf claims that the saint 
does not fulfill our ideal conception of a person because they have to give up who they are for 
the good of others. We want our heroes not merely to do what is morally good, but to live a good 
                                                
125 See footnote 79. I take it that if a being loves all creatures, he will usually act according to justice. However, this 
need not be the case. Arguing this point would take me well outside the scope of this paper. 
126 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, second edition, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 200. 
127 Ibid., p. 201. 
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life, to cultivate non-moral virtues, and to have non-moral, good life experiences. The life of the 
moral saint, says Wolf, disturbs us, not because their life highlights our moral weaknesses, but 
because it evidences a lack of a personal self in the saint, who is forced by an overriding concern 
for others to abandon their desires.128 
 I sympathize with Wolf’s sentiment. The moral saint, as described by her, is not an ideal 
person. Nevertheless, I want to maintain that it is ideal for us to pursue utter moral perfection. To 
integrate (1) the notion that it is ideal to be morally perfect, and (2) the notion that it is not good 
to give oneself over to a complete and utter life of self-sacrifice, we can maintain that it is 
morally good for one to love oneself.  
One objection to utilitarianism is that it is too demanding of persons always to maximize 
the good, which might get in the way of personal development and growth. Though there are 
responses to this, as there are responses to nearly everything, what seems right to say, 
nevertheless, is that the virtue of love sometimes is justifiably extended to the advancement of 
one’s own person, though this might not maximize happiness. I ought to love myself. If I neglect 
my own good, this is not bad primarily because it prevents me from giving aid to others as a 
means to maximizing the good. Though it might be bad to some degree because of this inability, 
it is incorrect to say that it is wrong primarily due to this inability. It is bad mainly because I fail 
to love myself. In Kantian terms, I fail to treat myself as an end.129  
Moreover, a benefit of care ethics, according to which we ought to love, care for, or care 
about certain people, is that it accounts for family ethics.130 Hard-nosed ethical theories such as 
                                                
128 Ibid., pp. 202-204. See also Michael Rea, “Divine Hiddenness, Divine Silence,” in Philosophy of Religion: An 
Anthology, sixth edition, edited Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012), p. 
271-274. 
129 In part D, I address the issue of using humans as mere means. 
130 Mark Timmons, pp. 282-288. See Margaret A. McLaren, section “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics, or Why Not 
Virtue?” paragraph three. See also Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
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utilitarianism seemingly demand of humans, duties that neglect the love people share within 
relationships in the interest of ethical impartiality. For example, a utilitarian might demand of 
humans that we flip the switch in the classic trolley problem, killing one to save the five. It does 
not matter who the people on the tracks are; they are equal in value and should be treated as 
such. However, care ethics demands that we pay special attention to our loved ones. If we have 
the option of giving to the poor or giving to our family, the virtue of love would demand in many 
situations that we give to our family as opposed to the poor. This does not mean that we should 
never give to the poor, but it definitely entails that one of our focuses should be on those with 
whom we are in relationship.  
But notice that this allows for personal care and for personal love. Just like we ought to 
strive for the betterment of our families because we are deeply connected to them, we ought to 
strive for our own betterment because we are more closely connected to ourselves. There is 
nothing wrong with seeking after our own good and flourishing. 
Historical ethicists have embraced this same idea as well. Adam Smith, for example, said 
that people ought primarily to take care of themselves because they are most fit to take care of 
themselves: “Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own 
care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it 
should be so” (II.ii.2.1).131 Smith says this in the context of also saying that people, in the pursuit 
of their own good, can neither “disturb [their neighbor’s] happiness merely because it stands in 
the way of [their] own” (II.ii.2.1),132 nor bring ruin upon others. Thus, we may maintain that it is 
morally acceptable for people to strive for their own good, but we must determine the extent to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), pp. 142-143 (III.3.13-14). Smith claims that we ought to care for our 
families more than we care for others. 
131 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1982), p. 82. 
132 Ibid. 
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which we may do this. The following examples seek to show that it is good, at times, to pursue 
one’s own good, even though (1) in doing so, we fail to prevent evil from coming upon others, 
and (2) in doing so, we cause evil to come upon others. 
First, a financially well-off and universally loving133 person might choose to spend 
money on fine wine for a relaxing night at home instead of giving that money to the poor. Even 
if we suppose that a relaxing night is the prevention of some evil, namely having a relaxing night 
prevents the person from not having a relaxing night, we can still say two things. First, his failing 
to have a relaxing night is a lesser evil than the evil the poor suffer. Second, he does not have to 
buy wine for a relaxing night, let alone fine wine. 
Second, another universally loving person might fail to jump onto a live grenade, even 
though doing so might lead to the preservation of the lives of several other soldiers in the room. 
Even if we suppose that failing to jump on the grenade is a good, namely by preserving one’s 
own life, the evil prevented by him jumping on the grenade is much greater than the good 
sustained through him not jumping on the grenade.  
Third, we can imagine a businesswoman employing a worker who is not very good at his 
job, and because of this, the business is bleeding money. Let us further suppose that if she fires 
this worker, the worker will not have enough money to pay for his apartment and will have to 
live on the streets. My intuitions tell me that even if the businesswoman universally loves, she 
might still fire the man, and there would be nothing wrong with this. In this situation, the loving 
woman does not merely fail to prevent evil; her actions bring about evil.  
                                                
133 It might seem impossible for a human creature to have universal love. To this, two things can be said. First, 
because we are talking about the LPE, we can simply assume that creatures in these thought experiments have the 
cognitive and affective capacities to love everyone. Second, we might want to make a distinction between loving 
impersonally all of humanity and loving personally each human; and we might want to say that we are obliged only 
to the former. In other words, every person might be obliged to love humanity (the general category of all humans), 
such that, whenever a specific human is in close causal or relational proximity, we are obliged to love that person 
personally, though we are not obliged to love every person personally due to our limited capacities. For a slight 
modification of this point, see Mark Timmons, p. 284. 
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Fourth, a universally loving introvert might prefer to live out in the country, where fewer 
people are, and choose to do so. Yet, by doing this, let us suppose, she has to drive into and out 
of town every day for work. She knows that this contributes significantly to climate change, as 
opposed to living in town and being able to walk, bike, ride the bus, or drive only a few minutes 
to work. Even if we suppose that living in the country is a good, her actions contribute to and 
cause something that is, presumably or potentially, far worse. 
In all of these cases, universally loving people can still buy fine wine for a nice night, can 
still refuse to jump on grenades for their brothers in arms, can still fire those who are causing 
their businesses to bleed money, and can still live in the country. The reason for this is because 
the virtue of love is not solely directed outwardly. Yet, there are conflicts that arise between the 
good that is sought for oneself and the good that is sought for others. Sometimes our concern for 
ourselves conflicts with the concern we have for others, but it is still perfectly acceptable to act 
according to self-love. But if it is a moral good for humans, who are not of very great value when 
compared to God, to seek after their own good and flourishing out of universal love, how much 
more will it be morally good for an infinitely greater God to seek after His own good and 
flourishing from universal love?  
But, what do I mean by the flourishing of God? This was discussed in section III, yet it is 
good to discuss it briefly here and to supplement it. First, I take it that one must actualize one’s 
potentialities to flourish. As has been argued above, a potentiality remaining merely potential 
within a person is not a good thing. Thus, straightforwardly, a loving God who is inclined toward 
Himself to some degree, ought to strive for the actualization of His potentials. Because God need 
not obligate Himself, there is a possible world in which He is morally allowed to actualize His 
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dispositions. So, I see no reason why it would not be good in those possible worlds for God to go 
ahead and actualize His virtues, some of which require evil. 
Second, if God has non-bad (that is, either neutral or good) desires of the heart, 
these desires must be met to some degree in order for God to flourish. What is meant by a 
“desire of the heart” is “a desire which is at or near the centre of the web of desire for” a 
given person, which is to say that a person’s desire of the heart holds up all her other, 
interconnected desires.134 Yet, if Eleonore Stump is correct that some “suffering 
stemming from unfulfilled or frustrated desires of the heart”135 is itself an evil that needs 
justification, God having unmet desires of the heart is a great evil. But there is at least 
one possible world in which the desires of God’s heart are for the great goods of 
actualizing His potentials.136 So, in that world, it would be a great evil for Him not to 
actualize His potentials. In God’s universal love, it is justifiable for Him to allow evil so 
that He Himself might meet some of the desires of His own heart. 
This account of God’s flourishing allows us to step in front of a potential objection. God 
is more powerful than humans. Because of this, one might wonder whether God could simply 
love both Himself and others without allowing evil. The examples I provided that illustrate that it 
is right for people to look after their own good, even though it might conflict with the good of 
others, were depictions of situations with limited humans and limited resources. God is not 
                                                
134 Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil and the Desires of the Heart,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 
sixth edition, edited Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012), p. 371. 
135 Ibid., p. 380. Of course, Stump was not using the idea of the desires of the heart to advocate for my position, but 
to show that the unmet desires of the heart for humans also need justification when answering the problem of evil. 
Nevertheless, she says the following: “And so, although no particular thing valued as a desire of the heart is essential 
to a person’s flourishing, human flourishing is not possible in the absence of the desires of the heart” (Stump, p. 
380). 
136 I take it that God has different desires in different possible worlds. If He did not, no world would ever be 
different. In actualizing our actual world, He had the desire for particular tree T to exist at moment M at location L. 
But if every desire in God is the same for every possible world, there is no possible world in which God actualizes T 
existing at M at L + 1 millimeter to the west. 
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bound by such limitations, so why could He not look after Himself and others without allowing 
evil into the world? 
The answer is that divine flourishing, which results through the actualization of God’s 
potentials and through the satisfaction of the desires of His heart that arise from His potentials – 
this flourishing necessarily requires evil. God could not have aimed in love for Himself for own 
His flourishing without intending for evil to be allowed into the world. If looking after His own 
good happened to conflict with the good of others, God could do nothing about it. It was good 
and right for Him to look after Himself, and He did. 
Does this mean that God never does what is good for others? This implies no such thing. 
God has love for Himself, but He also has love for people other than Himself. It might just 
happen that some evils arise because some of God’s actions are not directed at others but at 
Himself, as love demands. God should not be purely self-oriented, but He cannot just give up His 
deep desires. Yet sometimes these deep desires conflict with the deep desires of others. 
Remember, we are not solving the EPE, but the LPE. The quality and quantity of the evil 
does not matter. We are asking whether any evil whatsoever is consistent with the existence of 
God. And it seems that it is. This evil could be a small, white lie, after which moment God will 
be able to forgive the liar. Or, maybe God allows a little bit of pain so that He can heal. This 
seems perfectly fine to me. 
To summarize, let us assume that any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is 
exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure goods in God (the consequent of (6) is 
true), and let us assume that the existence of greater worlds can limitlessly be ensured by God. 
Even so, because God has a loving nature that is inclined both toward His own good and the 
good of others, and because there are no best worlds, and because God has no moral obligations, 
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it is not the case that for any world X that requires or permits evil, there is some world Y that 
models pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y. His 
good reason is that, in love, He desires the flourishing of His people, which requires evil as they 
actualize their potentials; and He desires the flourishing of Himself, which requires evil as He 
actualizes His potentials. Thus, premise (9) is wrong. 
 
D. Concerns and Replies 
Let us consider four matters of concern. 
 One matter of concern is whether we can distinguish between being selfish and being 
self-interestedly virtuous. Surely a good ethical theory will not entail that people can be selfish 
while virtuous. If so, what makes one person selfish and another person self-interestedly 
virtuous? The answer I suggest is as follows. We proposed before the idea of a meta-virtue. It 
might be that love directed at oneself is only a virtue when supplemented by love directed at 
others. It might be that we ought to care for everyone, including others and ourselves, but we 
must be in balance between the two. We must meet the mean of loving ourselves and loving 
others.137 
 A second concern is this: Even if one can love oneself justifiably, and even if one ought 
to love oneself, should one not still love others more than oneself? Or, we might ask a somewhat 
different but related question: Even if virtuous agents ought to look after their own good, is 
looking after the good of others not a greater good, such that a virtuous agent ought to act for 
others first and then for oneself? I respond to this in three ways. 
                                                
137 Again, I do not necessarily embrace that each action must be loving of oneself and loving of others. One action 
might flow purely from self-love, and another action might purely flow from the love of others. But, nevertheless, 
there needs to be some sort of balance between the two. We cannot have a world without self-love, and we cannot 
have a world without love that is directed at others. Both are necessary for the best worlds and for the best people. 
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 First, I am inclined to ask very simply: Why think this? Remember, this theory is built on 
the assumption that God has no obligations. This argument would not work if we were to 
suppose that God, say, had a duty to save His people from some disaster, in which case, God 
would be morally obligated to do such a thing. But, if God really has no duty, why would He not 
be able to act according to His own self-interest, which might conflict with the prevention of 
evil? By not having a duty, God does not have to privilege one virtuous action over another. He 
would be just as virtuous acting according to His self-love as He would if He were to act from 
His others-oriented love. 
 Second, let us grant the point and say that God ought to love others more than Himself. 
Even so, why does that make one difference to the theory? We might say that a virtuous person 
ought primarily to give himself over to helping the poor, but, as noted earlier, I doubt that 
anyone would say that he ought to neglect any and all self-oriented actions except those that keep 
him functioning as an aid worker. Surely we will grant that it is good at least some of the time 
for him to do what is in his own interest, even though it might not prevent harm from coming to 
others or it might cause harm to others. But if God can act lovingly some of the time toward 
Himself, there is at least one possible world in which God acts for Himself by actualizing His 
potentialities that require evil.  
 Third, one significant aspect of loving others is helping them to flourish. So, even if God 
must love others more than Himself, we are still driven to the same conclusion: God would allow 
evil into the world (whatever quality or quantity that might be) to facilitate the flourishing of His 
creatures. 
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The third matter of concern is that someone might respond by saying that my argument 
entails that God uses humans as mere means for the fulfillment of His own desires.138 God, says 
the critic, uses humans as a means of obtaining the actualization of His own potentials by 
allowing them to commit evil. Because the existence of evil is a necessary condition for some of 
God’s actualizations, humans enduring evil (either by committing them or by being the victim of 
them) is a necessary condition for some of God’s actualizations. For God to allow evil so that 
actualizations might arise is God using humans. This is not morally permissible. 
In response to this, I point out three things. First, the creatures in any given possible 
world need not be rational. It might be that God uses non-human, non-rational, and non-
autonomous agents as mere means. This is not the EPE, but the LPE. The creatures being used as 
mere means so that God might actualize His potentials need not be humans, so God need not use 
humans as mere means. 
Second, it might be that in these worlds God does not use anyone as mere means. The 
Kantian principle does not state that humans cannot be used as means at all, but as mere means. 
This suggests that if God treats humans (or whatever rational creatures there are in a given 
possible world) also as ends, then God is not guilty of any moral wrongdoing (in this capacity at 
least) because He is not treating them as mere means. Yet, part of God’s intention in allowing 
evil might be for creaturely actualization and flourishing because, by virtue of His love for them, 
                                                
138 See Marilyn McCord Adams, “Plantinga on ‘Felix Culpa’: Analysis and Critique,” Faith and Philosophy 25, no. 
2 (2008), pp. 123-140. By pushing the Kantian principle that it is immoral to use humans as mere means, she argues 
against Plantinga’s felix culpa theodicy, according to which God allows evil into the world so that incarnation and 
atonement might be made. See Plantinga’s “Supralapsarianism or ‘O Felix Culpa,’” pp. 1-25. My account is similar, 
but different, in that incarnation and atonement are not directly related to any person’s individual good, but are more 
in line with being global goods; whereas actualization is required for both divine and creaturely flourishing, making 
it more of a personal good, which also increases the good of the world on the whole. See Marilyn McCord Adams, 
p. 129. 
 83 
He values creatures as ends.139 In allowing evil so that creatures may flourish, God treats 
creatures as Kant required. In this, God can then pursue His own actualization because He treats 
humans as ends and not merely as means. In summary, then, God might first love His creatures, 
which causes Him to value them as ends, which causes Him to treat them as ends by allowing 
evil so that they may flourish as the beings that they are as they model God’s goodness; and once 
this is done, this morally allows God also to use humans as means for His own actualization. 
An objector might respond by pointing out that the above argument misunderstands the 
Kantian principle by assuming that if ever God treats humans as an end, then God is thereby 
forever off the hook and is able to use humans as means after that however He wishes. Suppose 
that God exists, creature C exists, and creature C’ exists. If God allows C’ to commit a moral evil 
so that God Himself and C might actualize potentials, God is using C’ in this particular instance 
as a mere means. Though God might treat C’ as an end in other instances, say, by allowing a 
small amount of danger so that C’ can flourish as a courageous being; in this instance, God is not 
using C’ as an end. Thus, though God might allow evil so that creatures may flourish, those who 
endure an evil E but do not flourish through E, are not treated as ends in God’s allowance of E. 
However, there are two responses to this. First, because we are discussing the LPE, not 
the EPE, we need not consider two creatures existing in a possible world, such that one is used as 
a mere means, while the other is treated as an end. Let us simply suppose that C exists, not C’. 
Even in this world, there are some actualizations that require evil, such as courageousness, 
endurance, and perseverance. These do not require moral evil, so they do not require a second 
creature who is used merely as a means. God could put a singular person into a slightly 
                                                
139 In other words, when x loves y, x values y as an end and aims for y’s own good. Though y might not actually 
have any value, love makes the lover esteem the object of love as an end. 
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dangerous situation to let her be brave and resilient in the face of trials. Natural evil, at least, 
could be used for flourishing. And this is all we need to disprove the LPE. 
Second, the fair distribution of allowing all humans to commit moral evil treats all 
humans as ends by virtue of the fact that each human could agree to be both the victim and the 
perpetrator of moral evil. Taking from the accounts of justice argued for by Thomas Hobbes and 
David Hume, we can see that fairly allowing moral evil for moral evil is a good that is in 
everyone’s self-interest, something that every rational person would choose. 
Thomas Hobbes’s account of justice begins with the claim that no one wants to remain in 
a state of nature, in which there is “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. XIII, 9).140 Because of this, 
rational creatures do not want to live in a state of nature. So, reason dictates to all people that 
they are to lay down their rights and to pursue peace, so long as others do the same (Leviathan, 
Pt. I, Ch. XIV, 4-5).141 David Hume, taking from Hobbes, said, “I observe, that it will be for my 
interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner 
with regard to me” (Treatise, 3.2.2.10).142 When everyone embraces such a convention to abstain 
from one another’s property, justice is thereby established and is conducive to society at large 
(Treatise, 3.2.1-6).143 In summary, then, it is rational to endure a little inconvenience (namely, I 
do not take from others without their permission, nor do I strive to take advantage of others) so 
that (1) my own life may go well, and (2) everyone’s lives may go well. 
We can apply this same thinking to the above issue. What does God do when He is 
presented with the fact that His creatures are unable to flourish without actualization, and with 
                                                
140 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), p. 76. 
141 Ibid., p. 80. 
142 David Hume, p. 315, emphasis in the original. 
143 Ibid., pp. 307-342. 
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the fact that they cannot actualize their potentials without moral evil? He sets up a system of 
justice, as it were. He, in interest of creature C flourishing, allows creature C’ to commit evil. 
Knowing that it would be unfair, something that C’ would not agree to if C’ were the only one 
committing evil, God also allows creature C to commit evil so C’ may flourish.144 Of course, 
God cannot sin, given PP and His necessary goodness. So, the only beings that can be 
perpetrators of evil are creatures. Thus, it is possible for God to allow evil into the world, 
distributed fairly to all people, except for Himself, so that everyone is both a perpetrator of moral 
evil and a victim of moral evil, so that humans might be able to flourish fairly as they actualize 
their potentials. Each person takes upon himself or herself a little inconvenience (namely, 
committing evil) so that (1) he or she may flourish, and (2) so that everyone else may flourish.145 
By allowing C’ to commit evil so that C may flourish, God is respecting both C and C’, 
in that He is respecting what they would both agree upon (namely, that they both commit moral 
evil and both become victims of it), were they to make an arrangement. At the least, were C and 
C’ to be informed that God had (in the past) distributed moral evil fairly between them for their 
own flourishing, they would make a retroactive agreement. 
We can see this further by considering what representatives of humans would agree upon. 
Suppose that representatives meet to discuss rules of justice. Were there to be impartial, unbiased 
judges trying to determine what was fair and good for two separate creatures, they would 
determine that both of them committing moral evil and being the victims of moral evil is the best 
                                                
144 Of course, neither creature could know about this. If both C and C’ were actually to agree to commit evil against 
one another for their own good and for the good of one other, I doubt that their actions would actually be evil. Their 
motives would not be malevolent. This might explain why God keeps us ignorant of the reason for evil in the actual 
world. I thank Warren Herold for a recent discussion concerning treating humans as mere means. His comments 
formed the basis for this footnote. For those concerned about this, see the next three paragraphs and footnote 146. 
Additionally, consider that C and C’ could both make the agreement that they would each commit moral evil and be 
the victims of moral evil, and they could also, at that same time, agree to be made (by God) ignorant of the 
agreement after it has been made so that they may genuinely commit moral evil. 
145 Remember, this is the LPE, not the EPE. 
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and most fair path. Each representative would strive to get what was best for those whom they 
represent, which would be their flourishing. But people can flourish only if there is moral evil 
also present. Of course, the representatives would not agree to allow evil if evil would 
overwhelm the flourishing of those whom they represent, but because we are discussing the LPE, 
we can posit that the evil is small. So the representatives would agree that every person should 
commit moral evil, lest fairness be violated, so that the people they represent might fairly 
flourish.146 
Thus, flourishing in conjunction with fairness, which representatives would agree upon, 
entails that everyone commits moral evil. But because these representatives are treating those 
they represent as ends, I struggle to see how God, who represents every creature by loving them 
impartially and seeking to do what is in their best interests, would be in violation of any Kantian 
principle. In other words, when I say that God treats creatures as ends by allowing evil into the 
world so that they may flourish, the evil spoken of here is a fairly distributed evil, according to 
which all humans become both victims and perpetrators of moral evils so that they may all 
flourish without inequality.147 
                                                
146 This is similar to John Rawls’s famous original position. See his Justice as Fairness (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 14-18. However, Rawls’s representatives are supposed to be modified 
versions of the people they represent – that is, x’ represents x, and x’ and x are similar in all respects, except that x’ 
is ignorant of certain biasing factors that x knows, and x’ is fully rational whereas x might not be. The 
representatives are not independent people who are fully rational but ignorant of certain factors concerning the 
people they represent – that is, y represents x, and y is ignorant of certain biasing factors that x knows, and y is fully 
rational whereas x might not be. I thank Warren Herold for discussion of this point. 
Nevertheless, this thesis does not require Rawls’s original position. Let us simply posit a slightly new way of 
analyzing the rules of justice, according to which representatives, who represent the good of independent people, 
decide rules of justice. Because the representatives are agreeing to the rules, the worry of footnote 144 is avoided. It 
is not that people agree to commit evil themselves, which seems impossible if actions are wrong due to, say, malice. 
It is their representatives, who act for the good of those they represent, that agree to it. All humans, then, commit 
moral evil, according to the agreement set forth by their representatives. This is possible given that the people do not 
know about the agreement their representatives have made. Yet, it is good and fair because the representatives, each 
of which was aiming for the good of those they represent, have agreed upon it. 
147 Each person being both the victim and the perpetrator of moral evil does not entail that each person commits the 
same amount of evil and is a victim to the same degree. Though there is a possible world with such a perfect 
balance, which is all that is needed to answer the LPE, my account here does not require a perfect balance. All I am 
saying is that each person commits evil to some degree, and each person is a victim of evil to some degree.  
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Third, even if the above account does not work to prove that God is not using humans as 
mere means, it is not clear that Kant’s principle is correct in the first place. Love and 
benevolence are the supreme virtues. Francis Hutcheson, former Chair of Moral Philosophy at 
the University of Glasgow in the eighteenth-century, embraced similarly that benevolence is the 
ground for all moral action.148 However, he also believed that all benevolence aims at the 
happiness of others. Because universal benevolence is the best version of benevolence, as 
opposed to selective benevolence, the maximally virtuous person will aim at “that Action 
[which] is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers”.149 If we 
modify this to make it clear that the maximally virtuous agent – that is, the universally 
benevolent or loving person – aims at the maximal amount of flourishing in the world, then we 
get right back to where I was. God aims at maximal flourishing because He is maximally loving. 
Kant’s principle, if it demands that we reject what universal love pursues, is simply wrong.150 
The fourth matter of concern is addressing Schellenberg’s arguments in favor of premise 
(9). He has three arguments in favor of it. Let me take them in order. His first argument is that 
evil causes a natural disappreciation. I do not deny this, but when evil is a necessary condition 
for such a great good as the actualization of God’s potentialities and the potentialities of His 
creatures, God would have a very good reason to choose a world with evil-involving-goods. Why 
would it be wrong for God to desire a world with such great actualizations? 
Second, Schellenberg says that because God is the greatest and purest form of goodness, 
in whom there is no evil, evil would only hinder finite creatures from coming into a greater 
                                                
148 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), p. 116. 
149 Ibid., p. 125. 
150 This universal love need not entail that love is equally distributed to every person. It might be good and right to 
love oneself more than others, or to love others more than oneself. I refer back to the meta-virtue. Because of this, a 
universally loving being might not maximize flourishing, but favor the flourishing of certain individuals (e.g., 
himself or his own family) more than others. 
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appreciation and experience of this goodness. My first response is that God might allow some 
evil due to self-love, not others-oriented love. Evil might prevent creatures from coming into a 
greater appreciation of Him, but that does not make self-oriented evil-involving-goods no longer 
great or desirable. Even so, my second response is that I see no reason why evil would prevent 
creatures from coming to know His greatness more. Indeed, evil is the condition in which God is 
able to exercise His perfect potentialities, sometimes directly for the good of the creature in the 
forgiveness of their sins! And, finally, my third response is that evil is a necessary condition for 
creatures exercising their modeling goods, which are potentials that reflect God’s perfecting 
potentials, making creatures see to greater extents the greatness and value of the perfections of 
God. In love, not in contrast to love, does God allow evil so that creatures might more fully 
know Him by experiencing the actualization of His potentials and their own potentials that model 
His. 
And, third and finally, Schellenberg claims that evil matters in our consideration of which 
world should be chosen. We do not just consider the final value of a world. In response, I admit 
that I agree. We care whether there is evil in a given world. However, this, in many respects, 
merely repeats his first argument. God does not desire the evil for its own sake, but merely to 
facilitate and to allow Him and His creatures to exercise their potentials. Evil matters in our 
consideration, sure, but so too must God consider, when determining what world to make, the 
flourishing of Himself and His creatures through the actualization of their potentials and through 
the fulfillment of their desires. God should not merely consider whether a world has evil or not. 
Therefore, Schellenberg’s arguments are unsuccessful at establishing (9), whereas my 
arguments presented above seem to refute this very premise.
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V. Concluding Remarks 
We have seen that Schellenberg’s argument fails at premise (6). If we reject that argument, we 
must reject premise (9). Thus, Schellenberg’s LPE does not succeed. 
 I would like to conclude this thesis with some short remarks on related material, namely 
the EPE. We might be able to solve the EPE through the same reasoning presented in this paper. 
I think this paper is a slam-dunk case against the LPE, but the EPE is harder to answer. So, I 
briefly offer the following two considerations.  
First, the actualization of divine and creaturely potentials continually through creation is 
not only a good, but also a great good. This alone seems to me to be a morally sufficient reason 
for all the evil that is in the world, as long as each evil is associated either with God’s 
actualizations or his creatures’ good actualizations. And, if either God or creatures actualizing 
their attributes is not itself a morally sufficient reason, God acting in love to achieve His and His 
creatures’ flourishing and to fulfill their good desires for actualization is in itself a morally 
sufficient reason.  
Second, as circumstances surrounding the actualization of a potentiality grow in 
substance – that is, as the context grows in significance – so too does the substance of the 
actualization. As the evil grows darker, the salvation grows brighter.151
                                                
151 I thank Thomas Senor for his comments and advice throughout the writing process of this thesis. 
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